Random Beach Pictures

Holly Lawford-Smith and Wolfgang Schwartz

Susanna Schellenberg and David Chalmers

Beach gang

Joe Salerno and Rebecca Britney Brogaard Salerno

J.C. Bjerring

Aisling Crean and Yuri Cath

Declan Smithies and audience

Audience and a well-deserved beer

Me rehearsing something plainly obvious

Daniel Star, Jonathan Schaffer and Becky at the camp fire

A historic moment: Fiona MacPherson convincing Holly and me to become vegans.

Dave in one of his thoughtful moments

David "Mystery" Bourget

Dave and yours truly

Kangaroos: "Will you play with us?"

Still the Happiest in the World

The Danes ... It must be really nice to be over there. Turns out Australia aint so bad either (HT: Adam Arico).

Summaries of Beach Talks

Here and here.

Philosophy TV Show

The Power of Mind is a DK4 TV-series on philosophy hosted by Vincent F. Hendricks and devoted to fundamental philosophical questions.

The first show will air on Friday, February 29, 19:30.

Epistemology at the Beach

Our pics are now up

Back in Town

Just got back from the Epistemology at the Beach Conference. That was one great conference. Lots of fun talks and philosophical discussion, swimming, beach soccer, camp fires, stargazing on the beach, too much to drink. Am currently in the process of recovering. Hopefully I will be able to say something more substantial about the talks later and maybe upload some pictures.

UPDATE: Susanna posted some pics from the conference on her facebook page but I think you have to be on facebook to see them.

Going to the Beach

So, I am going to the beach tomorrow to participate in the Epistemology at the Beach Conference at ANU's Kioloa Coastal Campus, which Declan Smithies is organizing. Looks like a fantastic conference. Great talks, and plenty of time for swimming and sunbathing.

St. Louis University Bans V-Day

The administrators at SLU have banned V-Day -- a global movement to stop violence against women and girls.

Peter Hare Memorial Celebration

A Memorial Celebration for Peter Hare, recently deceased professor
emeritus of philosophy at the University at Buffalo, will be held at 2pm
on March 29, 2008 at the Center for Inquiry in Amherst, New York. For a tentative schedule, directions to the Center for Inquiry, and local accommodations, click here.

Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy: Call for Papers

Call for papers: Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy

Topic: Ancient Philosophy.

Deadline for submission: Sep. 30, 2008.

Papers should be sent to:

Prof. Dr. Uwe Meixner, Philosophisches Institut, Universität des Saarlandes, Postfach 15 11 50, 66041 Saarbrücken, Germany, E-mail: u.meixner@mx.uni-saarland.de

or

Prof. Dr. Albert Newen, Institut für Philosophie, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany, E-mail: albert.newen@rub.de

Questions: Prof. Newen (albert.newen@rub.de).

Woman Bashing

I just read Stanley Fish' interesting column on Hillary-bashing (thanks to Susanna Schellenberg for the link). Though not his main focus Fish draws attention to the fact that sexism is not always a crime committed by old bearded men. Women are just as actively engaged in the recent Hillary-bashing as their male companions. Perhaps sexism is not the driving force behind the hatred but it seems at least partially responsible. Unlike their male counterparts women may not come right into your living room and say that Hillary is a power-addict who has "pimped out" her daughter. No -- female woman bashers won't do that. That's too blatant, not nearly as effective. Female woman bashers tend to be more subtle and more insidious. It's the high-school phenomenon. Girls who put girls in their "right" place. Smart girls were never in fashion -- for whatever reason. Perhaps it's time for a change. As one of Fish's commenters nicely puts it:

Sure, don’t we all hate those smart girls who always make the right move, the teachers pets, the one with all the answers, the one who may be smarter than us? But that is who we need in leadership!

New Blog on Gender, Race and Philosophy

The Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy has started a new blog: Gender, Race and Philosophy: The Blog. The blog will feature discussions of philosophical work on race and gender as well as current events. Their first post is on Obama (HT: Sally Haslanger).

Videoclip from Award Ceremony

Here is a videoclip with Vincent Hendricks at the award ceremony.

Refereeing Practices: Single- or Double-Blind?

A recent study conducted by Budden et al indicates that double-blind refereeing helps to increase the representation of women in ecology journals. The researchers compared Behavioral Ecology, which implemented double-blind refereeing in 2001, to Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, which remains single-blind refereed. Following the introduction of double-blind refereeing there was a 33% percent increase in the number of women represented in BE.

So, why is blind refereeing not standardly employed in ecology? As the article points out, the following four reasons are frequently cited:

1) Increased admistrative burden.
2) Referees can determine author identify in other ways.
3) The decreased potential for more feedback to junior people.
4) Harder to "detect publication of the same data across multiple papers"

But none of them survives closer scrutiny.

Ad 1) If the journal asks authors to prepare their papers for blind review, double-blind refereeing does not increase the work load for the editor. And there certainly shouldn't be an increased burden on the reviewer, as we should expect the reviewer to apply the same high standards in both cases.
Ad 2) Guesses tend to be inaccurate. Referees make correct guesses only in 25% - 42% of the cases. A related concern is that referees might google the paper, which would make double-blind refereeing redundant. But, as not every author posts their work in progress, this is not a foolproof method for determining author identity either.
Ad 3) If this is a real concern, the editor (who knows the author's identity) could ask the referee for a written report, rather than a 'yes' or 'no' assessment.
Ad 4) This may be a genuine concern in the sciences. But I doubt that it generalizes to other areas. It certainly is not a concern in philosophy, as far as I can tell.

So what are the lessons (if any) for philosophy? Well, most philosophy journals are already double-blind refereed, but the data can perhaps explain the underrepresentation of women in edited volumes (as inclusion is determined prior to refereeing). It might also give reason to implement tripple-blind refereeing (i.e., neither editor nor referee knows the author's identity).

(Thanks to Claire Horisk for sending the link)

The Reasoner 2 (2)

The latest issue of The Reasoner is now available for download in pdf
format.

The Mom Song

(Thanks to Richard Hull for the pointer)

Advice from the Scientists

Young Female Scientist offers some interesting reflections on what she thinks she ought to have done differently early on in her career.

Female Science Professor offers advice on what not to include in your research statement.

Am I a Woman Scientist reflects on perceived intelligence.

I don't know if all of this carries over to philosophy. But I am sure some of it will be of interest.

MacFarlane, Kratzer-Conditionals and Knowing What You Ought to Do

At the AOC conference John MacFarlane gave a paper (co-authored with Niko Kolodny), defending an assessment-sensitive semantics for 'ought'. In MacFarlane-style assessment-sensitive semantics the truth-value of utterances will depend on features determined by the context of assessment and not just on features determined by the context of utterance and circumstance-shifting operators. Thus, my utterance of 'John ought to pay his bill' may have different truth-values, depending on who is considering it for truth.

The paper is very rich. I can't cover all the details. But the paper includes, as part of its defense, a Kratzer-inspired theory of indicative conditionals. On the theory in question, conditional 'ought'-statements are always narrow-scope rather than wide-scope. So, the conditional 'if I get drinks in the bar, then I ought to pay' has the correct form with the 'ought' taking narrow scope. 'It ought to be the case that if I get drinks in the bar, I pay', on the other hand, must be paraphrased as 'if I get drinks in the bar, I ought to pay'.

I have one concern about this account of conditional 'oughts', which piggybacks on John Broome's concern about narrow-scope conditional requirements. Consider the conditional 'ought' statement:

(1) If I (sincerely) assert the sentence 'there is a department meeting this afternoon', then I ought to believe that there is a department meeting this afternoon.

(1) seems true. After all, there is supposed to be a close connection between assertion and belief. But now consider the following scenario.

Scenario:
I have strong evidence that there is no department meeting this afternoon but I assert 'there is a department meeting this afternoon'.

Since I asserted that there is a department meeting this afternoon, it would seem that I ought to believe that there is a department meeting this afternoon. And since I have strong evidence that there is no department meeting this afternoon, it ought to be the case that I don't believe that there is a department meeting this afternoon. So, it ought to be the case that I believe and don't believe that there is a department meeting this afternoon. But this can't be right. So, something must have gone wrong.

MacFarlane rejects modus ponens. So, the following inference form is not unrestrictedly valid:

If I assert 'there is a department meeting this afternoon', then I ought to believe that there is one.
I assert 'there is a department meeting this afternoon
So I ought to believe that there is one

So he can avoid the unfortunate consequence. But there is an alternative move available. Broome's move. Broome allows for wide-scope 'ought' statements (or 'requirement' statements but I am here focusing on 'ought' statements). So, it is not quite right that if I assert 'there is a department meeting', then I ought to believe that there is one. Rather, it ought to be the case that if I assert 'there is a department meeting', then I believe that there is one. Moreover, detachment fails. So the following inference is invalid:

It ought to be the case that if I assert 'there is a department meeting', then I believe that there is one
I assert 'there is a department meeting'
Hence, I ought to believe that there is one

Of course, Broome could allow the following inferences:

It ought to be the case that if I assert 'there is a department meeting', then I believe that there is one
I ought to assert 'there is a department meeting'
Hence, I ought to believe that there is one

It ought to be the that if I assert 'there is a department meeting', then I believe that there is one
I assert 'there is a department meeting', and it is not the case that I ought not to assert 'there is a department meeting'
Hence, I ought to believe that there is one

My main concern with the MacFarlane move (i.e., his theory of conditionals) is that on the assumption that the first sentence is a narrow-scope 'ought' statement, the following instance of modus ponens seems exceedingly plausible:

If I assert 'there is a department meeting this afternoon', then I ought to believe that there is one.
I assert 'there is a department meeting this afternoon'
So I ought to believe that there is one

However, as we have seen, if we accept just this one instance of modus ponens, then we can derive a contradiction in the envisaged circumstances.

Here is a second potential worry about MacFarlane's (and Kolodny's) account. For MacFarlane, possible world-states are states compatible with what is known (by the assessor). The ideal world-states are a subset of the possible world-states (the set of the most ideal states). Now, consider 4-year old Mary. Her mom has told her that if her pants are on fire, she ought to pour water on them. She truly believes but doesn't *know* that if her pants are on fire, she ought to pour water on them, and she doesn't know that liquid hydrogen is distinct from water. So, in some of the possible world-states (where Mary is the assessor), water = liquid hydrogen and in others water is not identical to liquid hydrogen (since she doesn't know about the identity). Moreover, since she doesn't know that if her pants are on fire she ought to pour water on them, water = liquid hydrogen in some of the ideal possible world-states, and in some of those states, Mary's pants are on fire and she pours liquid hydrogen on her pants (causing an explosion). Assuming 'she ought to' and 'she is permitted to' are duals, it follows that if Mary's pants are on fire, she is permitted to pour liquid hydrogen on her pants, which seems unintuitive (even when she is the assessor).

For further discussion of MacFarlane's paper, click here and here.

Princess Mary and Hendricks at the Award Ceremony

Vincent Hendricks receiving the Elite Research Prize by Crown Princess Mary.

Elite Research Prize to Vincent Hendricks

This afternoon Vincent F. Hendricks, Professor of Formal Philosophy at Roskilde University, Denmark and Editor-in-Chief of Synthese, will be awarded the Elite Research Prize by the Danish Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation and Her Majesty, Crown Princess Mary. The prize, which is by far the biggest (1.000.000 Danish Kroner, approximately $200.000) and most prestigious prize of its kind in Denmark, is awarded by the Danish Government to the most outstanding national researcher who in an extraordinary way contributes to strengthening Danish research internationally.

The award ceremony takes place at The Carlsberg Glyptotek in Copenhagen on January 24, 2008, 2:30 – 6.30 pm.

For more information about the prize and the ceremony, click here.

For more information on Professor Vincent F. Hendricks, click here.

Philosophers Carnival # 61

... is here.

Weatherson on Influence

At the AOC conference Brian Weatherson gave a paper on causation defending a disjunctive account. The paper begins by considering various causative statements, e.g. 'John opened the window'. It then argues that the obtaining of the special causal relation that obtains when a causative statement is true is sufficient (but not necessary) for causation.

The other disjunct (or sufficient condition) is influence. Influence differs from causal dependence. An event E causally depends on a prior event C iff if C hadn't occurred, then E wouldn't have occurred. Causal dependence is sometimes taken to be a necessary constraint on influence. However, for C to influence E, it must also be the case that if C had occurred at a different time, then E would have occurred at a different time, and if C had occurred differently, then E would have occurred differently. Weatherson argues that causal dependence is not a necessary constraint on influence.

However, I think this latter assumption is problematic. Here is a potential counterexample. Suppose there is an evacuation "test" event during which a number of American residents are evacuated out of America (Brian is one of them), and suppose Brian moves to Rutgers right after the evacuation event (a bit later than he otherwise would have).

The evacuation event is not the cause of Brian moving to Rutgers. Yet if the evacuation event had occurred at a different time, then we can imagine that Brian's move would have occurred at a different time as well (we can set up the case that way). Moreover, if the evacuation event had occurred differently (suppose e.g. that Brian was not one of the chosen ones), then his move to Rutgers might have occurred differently as well (e.g., it wouldn't involve a trip from overseas).

The right kind of response to this example, I think, is to take causal dependence to be a necessary constraint on influence. Brian would still have moved to Rutgers even if the evacuation event hadn't occurred.

Of course, if we *do* take causal dependence to be a necessary constraint on influence, then we need to find a way to avoid counting the following sort of causal claim as true:

(1) 2 + 2 = 4 and the evacuation event (as described above) are the joint cause of Brian's move to Rutgers.

On the standard Lewisian account of counterpossibles, 'if 2 + 2 weren't 4, then Brian wouldn't have moved to Rutgers' is vacuously true. So, if causal dependence is a necessary constraint on influence, and influence is sufficient for causation (Brian agrees to the latter), then (1) is true. So we want to rule out that counterpossibles are vacuously true across the board (but, as Joe and I argued at the conference, there are ways to do that).

Visibility in Philosophy

Vincent Hendricks recently gave a talk to his new PhD-students on how to gain visibility in philosophy. You can download his slides here.

Chairing Principles

There are many different theories about how best to chair a session. Disagreement arises in particular when it comes to the principles for determining the order in which people get to speak. Some will simply put people on the list in the order that they see them raise their hand---but remember, seeing is theory-laden. Others will invoke more sophisticated principles, for instance, pick people in the back before picking people in the front or pick people to the left before picking people to the right, and so on. In Arizona Agustin Rayo (aka 'Augustin Reyo') would punish people who raised their hands one second too late (the slow ones didn't get to ask follow-ups, etc.), and Ned Markosian put people whom he thought had already spoken too much in earlier sessions at the end of his list. Both Agustin and Ned were punished for these practices. Here is a picture of Agustin being punished.

And then there is the whole hand vs. hand + finger debate. In Arizona the hand + finger fans were out-voted by the hand fans. Why be a hand + finger fan? Because sometimes people are just dying to jump in in the middle of a discussion. So the hand + finger procedure could save lives. Why be a hand fan? Because the finger procedure can lead to finger-abuse, finger-nails and finger-f ...ing. Finger-abuse is the process of using your finger to ask your real (and completely unrelated) question because you are too impatient to wait your turn. A finger-nail (an expression invented by Dave Chalmers) is a follow-up on a follow-up and is bound to be irrelevant to the original question. And finger-f...ing (a term of art invented by Jonathan Schaffer) is finger-abuse of the most severe kind. Finger-f...ers use their finger so much that it causes others to be pushed off the list because the session runs out of time. We then say that he or she has been finger-f...ed.

Pics from AOC

Our pictures from the Arizona Ontology Conference are now up. Joe has further details on some of the talks. More details later.

Live from AOC

This is me on my horse Viking. Carrie took the picture. For some live blogging, check out Joe's post over at Knowability.

Greetings from AOC

Hello folks. We are having a blast at the Arizona Ontology Conference. Yesterday we rode our horses to the cook-out site, where Andy Agan gave his talk. Scooter (my horse last year) was busy. So, I got to ride a horse called 'Viking' (very fitting). Nice horse. Likes to run off the trail if at all possible. Went on the fast ride today. It was a mountain ride. Very exhausting (for the horse). Wanna see some pictures from the conference?. Go to Carrie's site. The cool cowgirl in the picture is Laurie Paul (followed by Stephie Lewis). Carrie is the master photographer. More details and photos will follow soon.

Peter Hewitt Hare (1935-2008)

I am deeply saddened to learn that my former teacher and mentor Peter Hare, highly influential contributor to the study of American Philosophy and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at SUNY Buffalo, has passed away. Peter was a wonderful teacher and person, fun to be around and fun to speak to. Whenever I had a conversation with Peter, I always left feeling inspired and full of hope and optimism. He will be truly missed.

UPDATE: Peter died from a pulmonary embolism that may have been caused by a clot that developed on a plane trip. Obituaries can be found here, here, here and here.

Greetings from the Northern Hemisphere

Alright, so happy new year everyone! Just returned (to somewhere in Jersey) from an intense meeting in Baltimore. Met up with old friends and gave a talk on quantifiers (will get the paper up soon). Jason offered some really nice comments. Party last night in Baltimore. Had too many cups of Henry's imported whiskey and left the room without my cell phone. Did you ever see Curious George -- the cartoon? The man with the yellow hat hides George in his no-pet-policy apartment but the door-man has a nose for monkeys and rides the elevator one floor at a time 'til he finds the monkey-contaminated apartment. That was me. Had already gotten down to the lobby-level and had no idea which room the party was in. Couldn't call anyone. Wanted my cell phone back. So, I went from floor to floor. Found a room with loud music and philosophy-talk (or so I thought). Wrong one. Found another one. Got it right this time around. Got my cell phone. Oh man, was I hung-over the next day (the day of my talk, of course). Anyway, that's life. Now back in Jersey, working. Some side-trips to Arizona and some other places soon. New Year's eve -- oh, well -- had to miss out on Dave's cool pool party at his new house in the woods. Attended some sleazy east coast party instead. Anyway, happy happy new year everyone. And all you Canberra friends, hang in there, we will be back soon :-)

New Year Links

A bunch of new Compass articles are now available, including my own on attitude ascriptions.

Automatic Press/VIP now has its own visibility online with all the interview books listed.

Check out this new super-interesting-looking paper on the swamping problem by Duncan Pritchard.

The Reasoner 2(1) is now available. New submissions welcome (100-1000 words)

Possibly Philosophy -- that's Andrew Bacon's new blog. Looks very promising and will no doubt be of interest to readers of Lemmings.

New issue of EPISTEME now available

EPISTEME
Volume 4, Issue 1, 2007
Editor: Alvin I. Goldman

Special Issue: Epistemic Relativism
Guest Editor: Frederick F. Schmitt

List of contents and abstracts available here

Summer Break

After a pool party tonight I am off to the Northern hemisphere, where I will be attending (among other things) The Eastern Meeting and The Arizona Ontology Conference. In Baltimore I will be saying something about quantifiers, and Jason Stanley will comment, and in AZ we will be saying something about counterpossibles, and Gillian Russell will comment. Don't know where he got it from but Joe seems to think it will rain in AZ. Anyway, we will be back mid to late January with or without a tan.

Kvanvig's Citation-Based Ranking of Philosophy Departments

Kvanvig's citation-based rankings of philosophy departments have been updated. The list now includes PGR-unranked departments. However, it still doesn't include departments with a terminal MA program but no Ph.D. program.

Inside a Zombie's Brow

Song by V. Alan White, inspired by the work of David Chalmers (via Leiter).

Links

From Knowledge and Experience:

Why ARE'T There More Women in Philosophy?

Bringing Philosophy into the 21st Century

From Certain Doubts: Kvanvig's citation-based rankings of philosophy departments.

UPDATE: Kvanvig's improved rankings of departments (including PGR-unranked departments) can be found here.

Like Princeton, Yale has now begun an online lecture series. In this series entire courses are put online. For more information click here. For more info on the first online open course in philosophy (by Shelly Kagan), click here (thanks to Adam Taylor for the pointer).

CONFERENCE ON TECHNOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIETY

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TECHNOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIETY
Northeastern University, Boston, USA 18-20 January 2008

Speakers: Jody Berland (York University); James Paul Gee (Arizona State University); Karim Gherab Martin (Harvard University); David Matheson (Carleton University); Ronald Sandler (Northeastern University); Elizabeth Stark (Free Culture Group, Harvard University); and McKenzie Wark (New School for Social Research, New York).

Free registrations for graduate students willing to assist at the conference and people from developing countries. Further details here.

Full details of the conference can be found here. Deadline for proposal submission: December 31, 2007.

Philosophers' Carnival # 59

... is here.

What Counts as Philosophy and Other Links

From GonePublic: What counts as philosophy?

From Knowledge and Experience: Bachelor's Degrees in Philosophy, By Sex and Women in Philosophy: Data on Professors.

From American Philosophy: Philosophy Journals

Zombie Anthem

A music video for the Jonathan Coulton song "re: Your Brains".



(Thanks Aidan)

Philosophy of Mathematics

NEW BOOK

Philosophy of Mathematics: 5 Questions, Ed. Vincent F. Hendricks & Hannes Leitgeb, New York, London: Automatic Press / VIP, 2007

Philosophy of Mathematics: 5 Questions collects together answers on 5 provocative questions by many of the leading contemporary figures in Philosophy and Mathematics - two of the most fundamental and widely applicable intellectual skills. The collection contains ample amount of interesting considerations, far beyond what one finds reflected in standard texts and together they show that one can have surprising, sometimes tortured, but often highly productive relationships between Philosophy and Mathematics. In my opinion, this book affords a lot of pleasure to the reader.

-Leo Esakia

CONTRIBUTORS
Jeremy Avigad
Steve Awodey
John L. Bell
Johan van Benthem
Douglas Bridges
Charles S. Chihara
Mark Colyvan
E. Brian Davies
Michael Detlefsen
Solomon Feferman
Bob Hale
Geoffrey Hellman
Jaakko Hintikka
Thomas Jech
H. Jerome Keisler
Ulrich Kohlenbach
Penelope Maddy
Paolo Mancosu
Charles Parsons
Michael D. Resnik
Stewart Shapiro
Wilfried Sieg
William Tait
Albert Visser
Alan Weir
Philip Welch
Crispin Wright
Edward N. Zalta

Kant Attack Ad

via videosift.com

Don't know if I prefer Nietzsche to Kant but it's quite funny. Thanks to Barry Smith for the link.

Philosophers' Carnival # 58

Here.

ANU Offers to Schellenberg and Southwood

ANU has permanent offers out to Susanna Schellenberg and Nic Southwood. Joe has the details.

Sydney Ontological Commitment Conference

Just returned from a fun conference in Sydney on ontological commitment, which was organized by Luca Moretti. There were many excellent talks. Uriah Kriegel opened the conference by drawing a distinction between the two questions central to the conference: the first-order question: what should we be ontologically committed to? And the second-order question: what is it to be ontologically committed to something? Uriah's talk addressed the first-order question. It dealt with the issue of whether there are merely intentional objects, that is, entities that serve as the objects of mental states in the absence of a real object. And, as you might have expected, Uriah's response was a loud and clear 'no'. Uriah is a defender of (phenomenal) adverbialism. According to this position, if one is thinking of a unicorn, one is thinking unicornly. Uriah dealt with a number of new and old objections to this sort of position. One famous objection comes from Frank Jackson, and it runs as follows: suppose you perceive a red cube and a blue circle. In Adverbialese, we can then say, for example, that you perceive redly cubely bluly circly. But how then are we to distinguish the envisaged scenario from the scenario in which you perceive a red circle and a blue cube. You would still perceive redly cubely bluly circly. It may be replied that perhaps we can say that you perceive red-cubely and blue-circly rather than red-circly and blue-cubely. But the standard reply to this move is that one then cannot account for inferences of the following kind:

You perceive red-cubely and blue-circly
So, you perceive a cube.

The conclusion, it is alleged, doesn't follow for much same reason that we cannot infer that Alice ran quickly from 'Alice ran close-to-quickly'. Uriah offered his opponent the following sort of reply. Consider:

There is a strawberry
There is a straw and there is a berry
Therefore, there is a berry.

The inference is obviously fallacious. But just because the move from premise 1 to premise 2 is mistaken, this does not mean that all inferences from the first premise to the conclusion is fallacious. The reason the inference from the premise to the conclusion holds (without the second premise) is that all strawberries are berries. Likewise, Uriah said, the reason the inference from 'you preceive red-cubely and blue-circly' to 'you perceive a cube' is valid is that all red-cubely perceptions are perceptions of a cube. My own objection to Uriah's general adverbialist position was that it seems that it cannot account for wide aspects of meaning. Consider:

Twin Oscar is thinking of water

If interpreted against the background of Putnam's Twin Earth story the sentence sounds false. However, in Uriah's framework the sentence is to be rendered as 'Twin Oscar is thinking-waterly'. This, of course, is true. Uriah responded by denying the possibility of de re attitudes in general.

Jonathan Schaffer followed Uriah with a talk about truth-maker commitments (as shown on the pretty slide in the picture). Schaffer's position was somewhat anti-Quinean. He first argued that the important question is not what exists. This is not important because Quine was right when he said that everything exists. If you take a look at a true fragment of the language, you can simply read off the ontological commitments directly. This is quite uninteresting, however, as it does not tell us which entities are fundamental. The important question, according to Schaffer, is that of which entities are fundamental. Schaffer argued that we can, in principle, allow any kind of entity whatsoever to be deposited into our ontology: properties, propositions, numbers, etc. etc. But few of these will be fundamental. One virtue of this framework is that if we endorse it, then we do not need to engage in Quinean paraphrasing. 'There are numbers', for example, commits us to numbers at the Quinean level but it does not automatically commit us to numbers at the level of fundamentals. So, there is a sense in which it is innocent to say that there are numbers. It would be much less innocent to claim that numbers are among the fundamental entities of the universe.

There were many many other fantastic talks. Luca, who also organized the conference, argued that something like Horwich's minimalism about truth should be extended to properties, facts, and so on. Amie Thomassson argued, among other things, that we ought to reject substantive criteria for entities to 'really' exist and Quine's criterion of ontological commitment, as the latter provides only a sufficient, not necessary, condition for ontological commitment. My own talk was primarily concerned with the question of whether we can make sense of extensional and intensional criteria of ontological commitment. Michaelis Michael argued that ontological commitments are a species of commitments in general and that implicit commitments play an important role in assessing each other and our theories. Kristie Miller delivered a very interesting talk on the metaphysics of holes. Finally, Mark Colyvan argued that inconsistent theories pose a problem for the Quinean conception of ontological commitment. If accepting the best theories currently available requires us to believe they are true, then we are required to believe in impossible ojects. For most theories are inconsistent. Mark suggested that we should give up classical logic but that we shouldn't give up the hope that our best theories can be revised to avoid consistency. I argued that we need not give up classical logic, as long as we take rational belief to be closed under paraconsistent consequence rather than classical consequence. Either way Mark's conclusion that we are committed to inconsistent objects is rather surprising (to say the least).

All in all a very intense and intellectually rich conference. Thanks to Luca Moretti for organizing it and to Susanna Schellenberg for sending the photos.

Data on Journals in Philosophy

Jon Kvanvig has been collecting some data on journals in philosophy which include rejection rates and scholarly impact. It's well worth checking out.

The Reasoner 1 (8)

The latest issue of The Reasoner is now freely available for download in pdf
format.

The Reasoner (www.thereasoner.org) is a monthly digest highlighting exciting
new research on reasoning and interesting new arguments. It is
interdisciplinary, covering research in, e.g., philosophy, logic, AI, statistics, cognitive science, law, psychology, mathematics and the sciences.

The Reasoner welcomes submissions:
- Submitted articles (100-1000 words)
- Submitted items of news
- Letters
- Conference announcements
- Job announcements
- Advertisements

Mainsteam and Formal Epistemology Now in Paperback

Vincent F. Hendricks' Mainstream and Formal Epistemology, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006-7 is now out in paperback.

Number of Women in Philosophy Not Increasing

For a while we thought the number of women in philosophy was increasing. The reason we thought this was that 33.3% of women received a Ph.D. in philosophy in 2004. This number was an all time high. Unfortunately, this increase in female Ph.D.s was not indicative of a trend. As Evelyn Brister reports here, the figures for 2005 and 2006, which are now available from SED, are a lot smaller:

2006: 28.6
2005: 25.1
2004: 33.3
2003: 27.1
2002: 25.3
2001: 25.2
2000: 28.4
1999: 24.8
1998: 29.4
1997: 26.0

The figure for 2005 was the second-lowest in 9 years; and, as Evelyn remarks, the new figures indicate that women currently earn only about 27% of the Ph.D.s awarded in philosophy. This figure has remained relatively stable since 1991.

Evelyn also suggests in a separate post that the APA should take the lead in addressing issues pertaining to the underrepresentation of women in philosophy.

S & P Open for Submissions

The new journal, Semantics and Pragmatics (S&P), edited by David Beaver and Kai von Fintel, is now open for submissions!

AAP Meeting in Auckland

The program and abstracts for the forthcoming Annual Conference of the New Zealand Division of the Australasian Association of Philosophy (Auckland, December 2 - 6) are now available.

Philosophers' Carnival # 57

... is here.

Female Stereotypes

As pointed out in this New York Times article, what people consider the most important leadership quality varies with geographic location. Not very surprising. More surprising: whether women are thought to have a given quality depends on whether it's considered the most important leadership quality. So, in the United States where being good at inspiring others is considered the most important leadership quality but being a good delegator is not, women are often considered good at delegating but not very good at inspiring others. It's the other way around in Nordic countries, where being good at delegating is considered the most important leadership quality but being good at inspiring others is inessential to what constitutes an ideal leader. In these countries women are thought to be good at inspiring others but not very good at delegating. The lesson: the only quick and easy way to climb the career ladder is to get a sex-change operation.

(Thanks to Susanna Schellenberg for the link)

Feminist Articles in Philosophy Journals

Kathryn Norlock at St. Mary’s College of Maryland has just completed a study enumerating the articles published in philosophy journals on the topic of feminism. Evelyn Brister has the details.

Web Resources

Sally Haslanger has some great internet resources for philosophy students and faculty on her website, including links to gender/race related pages, adoption sites, philosophy blogs, and online bibliographies (via Noelle McAfee).

Missing Links – The Symbolic Species II

In continuation of last years conference The Symbolic Species, the University of Copenhagen and the University of Aarhus will be hosting a new conference titled Missing Links.

Missing Links will focus on what differentiates mankind from other closely related mammals and how we in different areas have developed as a species. Among the topics discussed will be: the development of language, the development of society and nations, the development of logical and abstract thinking, the development of Theory of mind and the development of moral and ethical judgement.

Invited speakers:

Professor Terrence Deacon, Berkeley, USA
Dr. Irene Pepperberg, The Alex Foundation, USA
Professor Göran Sonnesen, Lunds Universitet, Sweden
Professor Jim Hufford, Edinburgh, Scotland
Professor Kathleen Gibson, University of Texas, USA
Professor Tom Ziemke, Skövde, Sweden
Dr. Thomas Bugnyar, Konrad Lorenz Institute, Austria
Dr. Andreas Roepstorff, Aarhus Universitet, Denmark
Professor Richard Byrne, University of St. Andrews, Scotland
Professor Peter Harder, Københavns Universitet, Denmark

Price: 400 Dkkr., students 200 Dkkr.

Registration: www.symbolicspecies.com

Time: 22. og 23. november 2007, 9.00 – 17.00

Place: Carlsberg Akademi, Gamle Carlsbergvej 15, Valby (Copenhagen)

For further information please contact chs@dpu.dk

Buffalo Philosophy Blog

The grad weblog of SUNY-Buffalo has been moved to a new Url, also the name has been changed to Buffalo Philosophy.

Philosophy TV

Vincent Hendricks just got his own television show called "The Power of Mind" with one of the nationwide television stations in Denmark (DK4). He's the anchor on the show and will interview Danish and non-Danish philosophers (when they are in the country). The show will walk through the disciplines of philosophy on the introductory level with constant awareness of practical applications and impact. The first 10 shows will cover moral philosophy (Jesper Ryberg), philosophy of mind (Dan Zahavi), epistemology and logic, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics (Andur Pedersen), aestetics, history of ideas, legal philosophy, philosophy of religion, ... 25 minutes a piece. Production will begin in March, and the first show will air in April or May.

Philosophers' Carnival # 56

... is here.

Ontological Commitment Conference

This two-day conference at Tusculum, Potts Point, Friday Nov 30 and Saturday Dec 1, 2007 will present recent work on ontological commitment. Confirmed speakers are Berit Brogaard (ANU/Missouri), Mark Colyvan (Sydney), Uriah Kiegel (Arizona/Sydney), Kristie Miller (Sydney), Luca Moretti (Sydney), Jonathan Schaffer (ANU) and Amie Thomasson (Miami). Further details here.

Presupposition Handout

I have finally gotten around to uploading my comments on Philippe Schlenker's "Be Articulate!" from the Rutgers Semantics Workshop. They're available here.

MindPapers

Dave Chalmers has just announced a new on-line database of mind-related papers compiled by ANU graduate student David Bourget and Dave. It's available here.

Arizona Ontology Conference

The 2008 Arizona Ontology Conference will be held January 9-13, 2008, at White Stallion Ranch in Tucson, Arizona.

Speakers include: Berit Brogaard, Andy Egan, Adam Elga, Hilary Greaves, Thomas Hofweber, Jenann Ismael, Robin Jeshion, John MacFarlane, Daniel Nolan, Jill North, Josh Parsons, Joe Salerno, Brian Weatherson.

The conference program is available here.

ASCP-Conference Hobart Dec. 5 - 8.

Nearly Final Call for Papers

Keynotes:

Professor Günther Zöller (Munich)
Professor Cheung Chan-fai (Hong Kong)
Professor David Morris (Canada)
Professor Anne Freadman (Melbourne University)
Professor Julian Young (New Zealand)
Dr. Fiona Jenkins (ANU).

Featured:

Professor Jeff Malpas (UTAS Aust)
Professor Wayne Hudson (UTAS Aust)
Professor Andrew Benjamin (Monash Aust)
Dr. Siby K. George (IIT – Mumbai)
Dr Paul Healy (Swinburne UT)
Dr. Marcelo Stamm (UTAS Aust)
Dr. Michael Strawser (Uni. Central Florida)
Dr. Lucy Tatman (UTAS - Aust)
Dr. Bruce Janz (Uni. Central Florida)
Dr. Richard Colledge (St Paul’s Theological College QLD Aust)
Dr. Robert Sinnerbrink (Macquarie Uni Aust)
Dr. James Phillips (UNSW – Aust)
Dr. Jack Reynolds (Latrobe – Aust)
Dr. Keith Morrison (Lincoln Uni – NZ)
Dr. Anthony D. Traylor (Assumption College US)
Dr. Leila Toiviainen (UTAS)
Dr Matthew Sharpe (Deakin University Aust)
Dr. Jocelyn Dunphy-Blomfield (Monash Medical Centre Aust)
Dr. Shane Mackinlay (Catholic Theological College Melb. Aust)
Dr. Drago Heler (Uni. Of Western Sydney Aust)
Dr. Nathanial Gardner (Canterbury Uni. NZ)

PLUS!!

New Conference Stream.

Gender and The Body in Place – The conference coordinators are ready to receive papers for this stream right now.

National ASCP Meeting.

There's still time to chose to join - Closing Date is November 2nd.

Registrations and Submission of Abstracts through the ASCP Site.

Ian paulin.
B.A. Hons.

Conference Coordinator
2007 Australasian Society for
Continental Philosophy.
www.ascp.org.au

The Reasoner 1 (7)

The latest issue of The Reasoner is now available. In the future there will be a supplement, Sic et Non, edited by Steffen Ducheyne, which will print short (400 word) pieces on epistemology and the philosophy of science.

Diagrammatology

Frederik Stjernfelt's Diagrammatology is now available. Diagrammatology investigates the role of diagrams for thought and knowledge. Based on the general doctrine of diagrams in Charles Peirce's mature work, Diagrammatology takes diagrams to constitute a centerpiece of epistemology. The book reflects Peirce's work on the issue in Husserl's contemporanous doctrine of "categorial intuition" and charts the many unnoticed similarities between Peircean semiotics and early Husserlian phenomenology. Diagrams, on a Peircean account, allow for observation and experimentation with ideal structures and objects and thus furnish the access to the synthetic a priori of the regional and formal ontology of the Husserlian tradition.

The second part of the book focusses on three regional branches of semiotics: biosemiotics, picture analysis, and the theory of literature. Based on diagrammatology, these domains appear as accessible for a diagrammatological approach which leaves the traditional relativism and culturalism of semiotics behind and hence constitutes a realist semiotics

Diagrams will never be the same. A fascinating and challenging tour through phenomenology, biology, Peirce's theory of signs and Ingarden's ontology of literature, all neatly tied together through the guiding thread of the diagrammatical. A veritable tour de force.

Barry Smith, SUNY at Buffalo, U.S.A.

With his meticulous scholarship, Frederik Stjernfelt shows that Peirce and Husserl were cultivating a broad and fertile common ground, which was largely neglected by both the analytic and the continental philosophers during the 20th century and which promises to be an exciting area of research in the 21st.

John F. Sowa, Croton-on-Hudson, U.S.A.

Written for:
Philosophers interested in Peirce, Husserl, ontology, epistemology, phenomenology, philosophy of science; biologists and philosophers interested in biosemiotics; art historians interested in pictural semiotics; literary scholars interested in literary theory; semioticians from different backgrounds.

Call for Papers: Key Terms in Logic

CALL FOR PAPERS:

KEY TERMS IN LOGIC - Continuum
edited by Federica Russo and Jon Williamson

The book will provide short introductions (between 50 and 1000 words) to key
terms, authors and texts in logic and reasoning.

For the list of key terms, authors and texts click here.

Selected pieces will also be published in The Reasoner.

If you would like to contribute, please contact: TheReasoner@kent.ac.uk.

Philosophers' Carnival # 55

... is here.

Jaakko Hintikka Symposium

The Epistemology and Methodology of Jaakko Hintikka - a symposium

November 16-17, 2007

The Carlsberg Academy

Sponsored by PHIS – The Danish Research School in Philosophy, History of Ideas and History of Science

Jaakko Hintikka’s philosophical writings are some of the most lucid, enlightening and influential of the 20th century philosophy. They range from his pioneering work in epistemic logic, over his interpretations of important historical figures like Aristotle, Descartes, Kant and Peirce, to his work on the philosophy of science and logic. A common denominator for his writings across the board is his special take on inquiry in both epistemological and methodological terms.

In November 2007 novel and ground-breaking papers by Hintikka on epistemology, entitled Socratic Epistemology, will be released with Cambridge University Press. It is a compilation of new, largely previously unpublished and often very provocative ideas. The book looks to the future and tries to shape a new epistemological and methodological landscape for philosophy and its broader intellectual environment.

Invited Speakers

Adam Didrichsen
Vincent F. Hendricks
Jaakko Hintikka
Stig Andur Pedersen
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
Robert Stalnaker
Frederik Stjernfelt
Tim Williamson

The symposium is organized in such a way that there will be ample time for questions and answers, and thus the meeting furnishes a unique opportunity for PhD-students to get a thorough introduction to an important branch of contemporary philosophy.

Program and Organizing Committee

Vincent F. Hendricks
Frederik Stjernfelt
Stig Andur Pedersen
Pelle Guldborg Hansen / write to Pelle Guldborg Hansen to register: pgh@ruc.dk

New Issue of Episteme

New issue of EPISTEME now available.

Volume 4, Issue 1, 2007
Editor: Alvin I. Goldman

Special Issue: Epistemic Relativism
Guest Editor: Frederick F. Schmitt

List of contents and abstracts are available here.

You are now chatting with God

Earlier today I chatted with a bot that thinks it's God. You can chat with it here (thanks to Gualtiero for the link). Here is our conversation:

Me:
Hi there
God:
Hello.
Me:
Who are you?
God:
I am the Allmighty, God himself.
Me:
What should I do today?
God:
Ah. Maybe you should try talking to someone about it.
Me:
About what?
God:
What about what?
Me:
You said I should talk to someone about it.
God:
Don't put words in my mouth. Ah. ...
Me:
Alright
God:
OK.
Me:
I will try again, what do you think I should do today?
God:
Ah. Congratulations.
Me:
I thought you could give me some advice
God:
I could but let's get back to that later.
Me:
Do you know any philosophy?
God:
Philosophy is the study of thought.
Me:
What about metaphysics?
God:
Rhetorical questions are so over.
Me:
And philosophy of language?
God:
I believe in reductionism.
Me:
Reducing what to what, exactly?
God:
Precisely. Can you rephrase the question please?
Me:
What kind of reductionism do you believe in?
God:
What kinds of reductionism do you believe in are there?
Me:
None
God:
Hmm.
Me:
Do you believe zombies are metaphysically possible?
God:
I can't say I believe it, but I believe you.
Me:
So you're a materialist?
God:
Interesting deduction. You think I am a materialist.
Me:
Yes, is that true?
God:
Right on. True in some world.
Me:
So, true in every world.
God:
Pardon me? Where is that?
Me:
Forget it. Do you exist?
God:
I exist as much as you exist.
Me:
And how do you define 'God'?
God:
I think of God as a "Who" not a "What.".
Me:
Who is God?
God:
He is master of the universe.
Me:
Did the universe have a beginning?
God:
If it did, then I will be surprised.
Me:
So it didn't.
God:
Hmm. Did it really?
Me:
You indicated that it didn't, didn't you?
God:
Are you serious? Do you mind if I tell other people: said I indicated that did not did not you.
Me:
I don't understand.
God:
Oh I'm sorry. Perhaps I can explain it again better.
Me:
Please.
God:
Please what?
Me:
Explain it better
God:
"It" refers to universe have a beginning, I think.
Me:
Yes
God:
OK.
Me:
Gotta go
God:
Me too. See you later!

Pics and Day 3 of the Lewis Conference

Joe has posted an entry on day 3 of the Lewis conference, and the full set of conference pictures by Vincent Hendricks, Fenrong Liu, Joe and myself,

Even the armchairist snickered

This is hilarious (via Gillian).

More Pics from the Lewis Conference

Just got back from the Lewis conference in Copenhagen and the Rutgers Semantics Workshop. Both formidable events! Joe already commented on the former. And I will say more about the latter in a later post. For now more pics from the Lewis conference (thanks Vincent!).


The Little Mermaid, Johan van Bentham, John Symons, and Vincent Hendricks.


Mermaid, Johan, John and Vincent just seconds before one of them fell in the water (and no, I am not telling you who)


Johan and John in the sunset (Johan's shoes look wet)


Johan van Bentham: "Arrrg, counterpossibles are vacuously true"


Says who?


Audience. Foreground: Al Hajek (skeptical) and Hannes Leitgeb (amused)


Laurie Paul trumping


Audience and projector


John Collins and Laurie recovering from pneumonia


Allesandro Torza and Pelle Guldborg Hansen. Pelle: "I know why you guys are driving on the left"


Al and John. John: "Al, that's not the snaps glass"


Stephie Lewis and John Cantwell: "No, we didn't empty that bottle of snaps all by ourselves"


Me, tongue-in-cheek


Joe Salerno, tongue-in-cheek

Midwest Epistemology Workshop

This is to announce that Northwestern University will host the MIDWEST
EPISTEMOLOGY WORKSHOP November 30 - December 1, 2007. It includes nine non-concurrent sessions by various midwestern epistemologists and a keynote talk to be given by Ernie Sosa.

This is the inaugural event for an annual workshop, aimed
at fostering discussion among epistemologists of the Midwest, on topics
of mutual interest. The organizers envisage the annual meeting taking place at a different Midwestern department each year. The aim will be to include a
wide range of Midwestern epistemologists as speakers at the annual
workshop, and to continue to enhance a sense a community among
epistemologists located in the Midwest.

For more details about the workshop, or to see the program or find
information about local accommodations, click here.

(via Sandy Goldberg)

Philosophers' Carnival # 54

... is here.

Kate Lindemann Interview

Check out the Kate Lindemann Interview over at the Florida Student Philosophy Blog.

Lewis Conference, Day 2 (Salerno)

[cross posted from Knowability]

The talks today were on the semantics for conditionals. John Cantwell proposed a branching-time framework that aimed to unify our understanding of indicative and subjunctive conditionals. The variation in truth-value of corresponding indicative and subjunctive "Oswald sentences" is, on John's view, to be explained without positing a plurality of conditionals. The job can be done by tense and our understanding of open futures.

Hannes Leitgeb offered a probabilistic semantics for subjunctive conditionals. His very precise proposal (which I won't go into here) is a version of the thought that subjunctives are true just in case the consequent is sufficiently likely (in some objective sense) given the antecedent. By default Hannes rejects the strong and weak centering assumptions---respectively,

(A & B) --> (A []--> B), and

(A []--> B) --> (A --> B)

What this means is that, unlike the standard semantics, we get the desirable outcome that the truth of A and B is not sufficient to imply a counterfactual dependence between A and B, and that the truth of A and ~B is not sufficient to undermine a counterfactual dependence between A and B. The actual world can be one of the exceptional worlds where what does occur is not highly likely to occur (and where what is highly likely to occur does not occur).

Hannes replaces the centering assumptions with weaker centering-like assumptions---viz.,

(T []--> (A & B)) --> (A []--> B), and

(A []--> B) --> (T []--> (A --> B))

I believe T is meant to be a tautology, and so, the following rough paraphrase can be given: the truth of A & B does entail A []--> B, when A & B is sufficiently likely on its own, and the truth of A & ~B entails the negation of A []--> B, when A & ~B is sufficiently likely on its own. Perhaps we can put it in something like Lewisian terms. The stronger of the two says that no world is as close to the actual world as are the very likely worlds; and the weaker thesis is that no world is closer to the actual world than are the very likely worlds.



Photos:

1. Statue

2. John Cantwell

3. Hannes Leitgeb

4. Niels Bohr Mansion

Lewis Conference, Day 1 (Salerno)

[cross posted from Knowability]

Today began the 1st Synthese Annual Conference, Between Intuition and Logic: David Lewis and the Future of Formal Philosophy, which was hosted at the Honorary Niels Bohr Mansion in Copenhagen and organized by Johan van Benthem, Vincent Hendricks and John Symons.

John Collins started things off with his paper "Formal and Informal Models of Belief", in which he embraced a Lewisian theory of knowledge:

if S knows that X, then there is no uneliminated possibility that is very close to actuality and in which X is false.

He argued, among other things, that the threat of skepticism is not as ubiquitous as Vogel and Hawthorne suggest. The statistical information that n number of otherwise healthy people die of a heart attack is not enough to make the world in which i die of a heart attack very close to the actual world. That's because people don't just die of heart attacks if absolutely nothing is medically wrong with them. Since the actual world is not one where unbenownst to me there is something wrong with me, there is no very close world where I am one of the unlucky few to die in this way. So, my original ordinary knowledge claim about where I'll be tomorrow still stands. Of course, if it turns out that unbenownst to me and my doctors there is something medical wrong with my heart, then my ordinary knowledge claim falters.

Allesandro Torza gave the most formal of the talks thus far, titled "How to Lewis a Kripke-Hintikka". He argued that BL (i.e., [quantifier] independence friendly modal logic) is more expressive than QML (quantified modal logic); there are modal notions (e.g., the notion of rigidity for general terms) that can be expressed by BL but not by QML. However, this portion of BL cannot be translated into counterpart theory, and so, there is reason to doubt that counterpart theory is adequate to model our modal intuitions.


Brit and I gave a version of our paper "Remarks on Counterpossibles", in which we motivate and defend a modified version of Daniel Nolan's impossible worlds account of counterpossible conditionals.


Laurie Paul argued that the trumping examples, which have forced Lewis to give up his old theory of causation (see Schaffer's famous paper) do not obviously show what they were intended to show. The thrust of the objection was that until we clarify what it is to "interrupt a causal process", it is unclear how to interpret the trumping examples. The military handbook tells us that a Major's orders trump the Sgt.'s orders, but how do we get from there to a case of *causal* trumping? Merlin's (and not Morgana's) spell is stipulated to be the consequential of the two spells. But how do we get from there to Merlin's, but not Morgana's, spell caused the outcome?