APA Report: the Status of Women in Philosophy

Thursday afternoon the APA Committees on the Status of Women and Inclusiveness sponsored a joint session on the central question "Why Are Women Only 21% of Philosophy". The session took place in the grand Crystal Room at the Palmer House. Given the importance of the topic I was surprised to find the room less than half full. Of course, the Crystal Room is rather large, but still. Another peculiarity: there were only 3 men in the audience, and one of them probably wouldn't have gone if I hadn't twisted his arm. One wonders whether male philosophers think female philosophers should solve this problem on their own.

As for the session, Erin McKenna chaired, and Sharon Crasnow, Elizabeth Minnich and Sally Haslanger gave excellent speeches which provoked much discussion. As Abigail Stewart was unable to attend (due to illness), Haslanger read her paper and answered several questions on her behalf.

Crasnow opened the session with a report on the raw numbers. Here are some numbers from her handout:

1) 21% of employed philosophers are women (Kathryn Norlock)

2) 18.5% of philosophy faculty at top 54 programs (Leiter Report) are women (Julie van Camp)

3) 2004 US Department of Education estimates 41% of those employed in the humanities are women.

4) National Digest of Educational Statistics (NCES) reports 39% female at postsecondary degree granting institutions.

5) Philosophy PhDs awarded: 27% (and stuck there for the last ten years or so, with a spike to 33.3% in 2004, 25.1% in 2005).

6) Survey of Degrees Awarded (SED) 2005 figures. History 41%, Astronomy and physics 26%, Economics: 30%, Political Science 39%.

The numbers speak for themselves: there are very few women in philosophy. But what is the explanation? Here are some of the possible factors mentioned by Crasnow and the audience:

A) Differential Treatment: male and female students tend to be treated differently by their (male) professors. For example, female students do not get called on in class as often as males.

B) Vicious Circle: female students lack contact with female professors. As a result, they do not feel inclined to pursue a career in philosophy.

C) Misleading Stats: Universities tend to focus on the number of women enrolled in the humanities as a whole. When the percentage of women enrolled in the humanities approaches 50, administrators tend to ignore the problem remaining in disciplines such as philosophy.

Turning to the second speech, Elizabeth Minnich reminded us that care must be taken when solving the problem of the status of women in philosophy. Even if 50% of employed philosophers were women, the problem of the status of women wouldn't necessarily disappear. For example, the problem wouldn't have been solved if there were 50% women but the 50% felt pressured to behave like men and do male-style philosophy.

Abigail Stewart was next. As she was unable to attend, Haslanger read her paper. The paper addressed the question of what can be learned from other disciplines. Haslanger (Stewart) mentioned that the performance of women tends to be under-estimated and that the performance of men tends to be over-estimated. This form of differential treatment has a lot to do with gender-schemas. Haslanger mentioned that the female schema clashes with the philosophy schema even if it doesn't clash with philosophy sub-schemas such as the ethics schema or the feminist philosophy schema. If a given discipline's schema clashes with the female schema, then the performance of females in the discipline tends to be under-estimated. The performance of women is also under-estimated when there is a lack of critical mass (i.e., less than 30% women in the discipline). The under-estimation accumulates at each level. As a result, there is a lowered career success rate. This, in turn, results in stronger gender schemas and a continued lack of critical mass.

Haslanger also mentioned that traditionally there have been three ways to deal with a schema clash: a) don't ask, don't tell (gays in the military), ignore (philosophy?), force out (philosophy?) Needless to say that none of these ways of dealing with schema clashes are tolerable.

Haslanger concluded the joint session with a paper on the representation of women in top philosophy journals. Some numbers from Haslanger's handout:

2002-2007 % female
Ethics: 19.30%
JPhil: 13.33%
Mind: 6.38%
Nous: 11.62%
Phil Review: 11.11%
PPR: 12.26%
PPA: 13.98%

Articles on feminism or race issues:
Ethics: 2.86% feminist, 2.86% race
JPhil: 0% feminist, 1.77% race
PPA: 5.13% feminist, 3.85% race

Haslanger mentioned that while more studies need to be done, it is evident that women are strongly disadvantaged (at least statistically speaking). Statistically it is much more difficult for a woman to get published in a top journal than it is for a man. The reason? Here are some suggestions from the session:

1) Nearly all of the top journals are edited by men.
2) No or few women are on the editorial boards of top journals.
3) Even journals that claim to do double-blind refereeing tend not to do tripple-blind refereeing. That is, the editors tend to know the identity of the author at some stage in the process.

The session ended with some "anecdata". Haslanger mentioned (among other things) that she had once been told that she ought to stick to history on the grounds that women ought to reproduce the ideas of men (and keep their own to themselves), that she had been told that she ought to get tested to see whether she was in fact a man (given her success), that people would laugh when she told them that she did metaphysics (would anyone ever laugh at a man?), and so on. The audience (including a female undergraduate student) had similar stories to report about the current climate in the philosophy profession.

In conclusion: the joint session made it exceedingly clear that despite efforts made (under the names of Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action) to prevent all forms of discrimination against women in academia (and elsewhere), many departments continue to tolerate discriminatory practices in graduate admissions, interviewing, hiring, promotion, article acceptance and invitation.

UPDATE: Richard Zach has a new report on the status of women in philosophical logic.

Philosophers' Carnival # 46

... is here.

Central APA Report

Just got back from the Central Meeting in Chicago. Yet another intense APA meeting with too many late-night events. There were very many super-excellent sessions, including: Josh Brown, Jennifer Nagel and Jason Stanley's session on practical interests and belief formation; Cumming, Groenendijk, Stokhof, Gillies, and Gauker's session on dynamic logic; Weinberg, Kvanvig, Riggs and Greco's session on the value of knowledge; and the joint session sponsored by the APA Committees on the Status of Women and Inclusiveness, featuring McKenna, Crasnow, Minnich, Haslanger and Stewart (impersonated by Haslanger). My own "Jerry Springer" session on donkey sentences was very enjoyable. Separate posts on the status of women in philosophy and donkey sentences will follow.

The Central APA

I am off to the Central Meeting of the APA in Chicago. My paper for the meeting is available here.

PHINEWS Vol. 10

PHINEWS volume 10, April 2007 (edited by Vincent Hendricks, Pelle Guldborg Hansen, Stig Andur Pedersen and Dov Gabbay) is now available.

UPDATE: I fixed the link. Thanks for your patience.

Sea Battle Semantics: New Draft

My Sea Battle Semantics paper is now nearly finished. I have replied to the main objections raised at the Pacific and hope to be able to send the final version of the paper to the nice editors at the Philosophical Quarterly (who were kind enough to give me an extension) shortly. If any of you has any further concerns, please don't hesitate to email me.

A Linguist with Erdös Number 2

It is rare to find a philosopher or linguist with an Erdös Number less than 3. Here is a rare instance. As Geoffrey K. Pullum reports, the mathematical and computational linguist Andras Kornai has Erdös number 2. Truly amazing.

Vincent Hendricks Wins Choice Outstanding Academic Title 2006

Vincent Hendricks' book Mainstream and Formal Epistemology, Cambridge, 2006, just won the Choice Outstanding Academic Title 2006. Hendricks is Professor of Formal Philosophy at Roskilde University in Copenhagen, Editor-in-Chief for Synthese and Synthese Library, Editor of Trends in Logic (Studia Logica Library), and Director of PHILOG and Editor-in-chief of PHINEWS.

From the original announcement:

Choice: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries is the premier source for reviews of academic books, electronic media, and Internet resources of interest to those in higher education.

Every year Choice publishes a list of Outstanding Academic Titles that were reviewed during the previous calendar year. This prestigious list reflects the best in scholarly titles reviewed by Choice and brings with it the extraordinary recognition of the academic library community.

The list is quite selective: it contains approximately ten percent of some 7,000 works reviewed in Choice each year. Choice editors base their selections on the reviewer's evaluation of the work, the editor's knowledge of the field, and the reviewer's record. In awarding Outstanding Academic Titles, the editors apply several criteria to reviewed titles: (1) overall excellence in presentation and scholarship, (2) importance relative to other literature in the field, (3), distinction as a first treatment of a given subject in book or electronic form, (4) originality or uniqueness of treatment, (5) value to undergraduate students, and (6) importance in building undergraduate library collections.

Choice Review:

Hendricks (Roskilde Univ., Denmark) identifies several central epistemological concerns and teases out various theoretical solutions. He begins with mainstream epistemologies, works through various formal epistemologies, and ends with an outline for a new research program called "plethoric epistemology," which combines insights of both mainstream and formal researchers. The aim of the work is twofold: to introduce mainstream and formal epistemologists to one another, and to give theoretical unity to a fractured discipline. It succeeds admirably on both fronts, and brings a fresh perspective to every topic it touches. This important work should spark conversation between traditional theorists and their more formally minded colleagues, and inform each of what the other has been up to. It should also bring unity and renewed purpose to the fragmented field of contemporary epistemology. This book is mandatory reading for epistemologists of all stripes, particularly those seeking a crash course in formal epistemology (and those just wondering what "formal epistemology" is). Its importance cannot be overemphasized. Summing Up: Essential. Upper-division undergraduates, graduate students, and faculty/researchers.

Synthese Deadline Approaching (Salerno)

This is a reminder about the May 1 deadline for paper submission for the special issue of Synthese, "Knowability and Beyond", which aims to cover modal epistemic issues relevant to knowability, broadly construed. The issue will contain invited papers by Jonathan Kvanvig, Gabriel Sandu and Neil Tennant, but will also provide the opportunity for other authors to make original contributions. Submissions will be double-blind reviewed. If you have something but aren't sure whether it would be appropriate for consideration, email me.

knowability@gmail.com

Impossible Thoughts

As some of you already know, Joe Salerno and I are writing a monograph on impossible thoughts. A book page has now been created. It is available here.

UPDATE: abstracts for most of the chapters are now up.

The Pacific APA

I am back from the Pacific APA, and I am getting ready to go to the Central Meeting on Tuesday (a real linguist -- Jessica Rett -- is actually commenting on my paper, so that should be fun). The Pacific was better than ever. Of course, it would have been great to have Jason Stanley take control of the meeting and the partying but I think we did alright on our own. Since the last post I went to Kent Bach's Context and Content session. The speakers were John MacFarlane, Zoltan Szabo, and Peter Lasersohn (actually I missed his talk due to a terrible eye allergy but fortunately I had heard him give the talk elsewhere). All excellent papers. Later that day I went to Michael Devitt's Author-Meets-Critics session. Michael and his critics' (Elisabeth Camp, Mark Crimmins, and Jim Higginbotham) inputs made for an entertaining afternoon. The day and night ended with a party (or two), and we left early the next morning in a condition not worth writing about.

Brief update from the APA

We are having a blast. My talk on sea battle semantics earlier today went well (the paper is available on my webpage). Peter Ludlow offered nice comments, and the questions from the audience were very helpful. When I get back, I will revise the paper and send the final version to the Philosophical Quarterly, who accepted the paper. Other highlights: there are so many. So I can only mention a few. David Chalmers' talk was quite a hit. It was on terminological disputes, translucent sentences and bedrock concepts. Berhard nickel's talk on generics was great. He talked about plural predication and scope ambiguities in generic statements. This is a topic I am very interested in. In fact, I have written several papers on it. So, Bernhard and I had fun afterwards talking about generics. The Kvanvig/Pritchard/Riggs/Greco session on the value of knowledge was really good. Kvanvig even responded (positively) to a criticism I made of his view in an earlier paper. Another big hit: J.C. Beall, Graham Priest, Octavia Buano, and Hartry Field on paraconsistent and paracomplete logics. I think Hartry managed to convince me that I should be a classical glut theorist -- to solve the Liar paradox. He is a classical gap theorist, but he still managed to convince me. Matt McGrath and Jeremy (the famous couple!) had a fun session on subject-sensitive invariantism (or to be more precise, their special variant of it). There were lots of other fun sessions, including sessions I had to miss because they either overlapped with my own or with other can't-miss sessions. Other than that, I can only say that there are lots of fun bars in San Francisco (Terry Horgan's and L.A. Paul's current and my former student Adam Arico got us thrown out of one of them -- Terry was thrilled to hear about it!) More bars tonight!!

Pacific APA

I am off to the Pacific Meeting of the APA in San Francisco. My paper for the meeting is available here.

Philosophers' Carnival # 45

... is here.

John Greco on Philosophy Talk

John Greco was discussing skepticism live at KALW 91.7 FM on Sunday March 25 on Philosophy Talk. The show is available here.

Reflections on My Talk at SLU

I had a great time at SLU yesterday. During my lunch with Eleonore Stump I learned that Eleonore is currently working on issues related to my work on knowledge-wh. Eleonore is especially interested in the neurobiological grounding of knowledge-how and objectual knowledge -- an approach which I find very fruitful. My own approach is primarily linguistic.

My talk went well. One issue that came up during Q & A concerned my analysis of knowledge-how. I treat knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-wh. The reason for this is that it is merely a fluke in English that 'how' is not a wh-word (in old English, old Nordic and Danish 'how' is a wh-word -- that is, it is not strictly speaking a wh-word but rather the equivalent of a wh-word in those languages). So, an adequate analysis of knowledge-wh should be extendable to knowledge-how. In my paper on knowledge-wh I offer a general analysis of knowledge-wh and knowledge-how which is based on my previous analysis of pseudo-clefts. On my analysis, 'wh' clauses are predicates. Two examples:

On my analysis, 'John knows what Mary did at 3 p.m.' cashes out to 'there is an x such that John knows that x is what Mary did at 3 p.m.'

And 'John knows how to play the piano' cashes out to 'There is a w such that John knows that w is how to play the piano' (this instance of my general analysis is very similar to Stanley and Williamson's analysis of knowledge-how)

Most of the questions after my talk concerned my analysis of knowledge-how. Among other things it was pointed out by Scott Berman, Jim Bohman, John Greco, Michael Barber, Joe Salerno and others that John may not know how to play the piano even if there is a w such that he knows w is how to play the piano. My immediate reaction was to refer to the gap between knowledge states and knowledge reports. After the talk Michael pointed out that there is a kind of ambiguity in 'knowing how' (not a lexical one). Sometimes we use 'knowing how' to talk about an ability to do something, and sometimes we use it to talk about knowing-ways (or in some constructions: degrees, as in 'John knows how difficult this task is'). That seems right to me. What I wonder is: how do we analyze 's knows how to F' in the ability sense? (compositionally, that is) Any ideas?

SLU Talk

I have uploaded a new version of my paper on knowledge-wh to my webpage. It is available here. This is also the paper which will form the basis of my talk at SLU on Friday.

Modes of Existence

I now have a draft of my review of Modes of Existence, which I am reviewing for Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. The first 12 pages are mostly summaries of the essays (Mulligan, Raspa, Kroon, van Inwagen, Varzi, Reicher, Barbero, Orillo, Spolaore). The last 6 pages are friendly criticisms of Achille Varzi, Giuseppe Spolaore, and others. The very last part is an (overly sketchy) extension of David Chalmers' 2Dism to fictional and perceptual reports. Comments welcome!

Singpurwalla to Maryland

My friend and former colleague Rachel Singpurwalla (currently at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville) has just accepted a tenure track offer from University of Maryland, College Park.

Links

Jon Williamson has started a new venue for short pieces called The Reasoner.

Adam Taylor is organizing a grad conference on powers, dispositions and singular causation.

Also check out this post on the overcrowding problem by Adam Taylor.

And this post on concepts by Jesse Butler.

Nancy

Just got back from the Knowledge and Questions Conference in beautiful Nancy - just east of Paris. In spite of the fact that I had to spend 4 days in Charles De Gaulle Airport on my way back to St. Louis because of Continental Airlines' less than brilliant overbooking policy and bad weather in Newark, I had a really great time. Franck Lihoreau did a fantastic job organizing the conference, and need I say that the food was unforgettable? I learned that Claudine Tiercelin caused something of a revolution in the French University system when she proposed that Russell's work should constitute one of the major components of the comprehensive exam which many French college students need to pass before graduating. Claudine currently holds a visiting position at Fordham University (in addition to her permanent position in Paris). Claudine is well-known for her work on Peirce's logic and is also making important contributions to variouos areas of mainstream analytic. I am a huge fan of Claudine's work on Peirce. She is one of the world's best (if not the best) Peirce scholars.

What else? I finally got a chance to meet Paul Egre (actually, I met him briefly at a book event organized by Hendricks and Pritchard last year in Portland). Paul's paper concerned the question of why wh-clauses embed only under "factive" (or deictic) verbs. Pascal Engel gave a super-interesting talk on the knowledge account of assertion which Timothy Williamson has famously defended, and Ian Rumfitt talked about knowledge and logical consequence. Among other things, he rejected Edgington's suggestion that the consequence relation is one that preserves truth under a priori implication.

Another paper that I rather liked was Maria Aloni's paper on de re attitudes. Maria offered a new 2Dish account of de re attitude ascriptions. As mentioned earlier, a rough draft of my own paper is available here. The papers from the conference are scheduled to appear in a special issue of Grazer Philosophische Studien.

Nancy, France

I am off to the Knowledge and Questions Workshop in Nancy, France. I have included the program below. My paper is available here.

Thursday 15th March
12.00—14.00 Registration, Coffee
14.00—14.10 Conference Welcome
14.10—15.20 CLAUDINE TIERCELIN, "The Fixation of Knowledge:
Pragmatist Parries to the Skeptical Challenge"
15.20—16.30 PAUL EGRÉ, "Epistemic Verbs and Embedded Questions"
16.30—16.50 Coffee Break
16.50—18.00 MARIA ALONI, "The Pragmatics of Questions and Attitudes"
20.30 Conference Dinner

Friday 16th March
9.30—10.40 JONATHAN SCHAFFER, "Knowing the Answer"
10.40—11.00 Coffee Break
11.00—12.10 BERIT BROGAARD, "What Mary Did Yesterday. Remarks on Knowledge-wh"
12.10—14.00 Lunch
14.00—15.10 IAN RUMFITT, "Knowledge by Deduction"
15.10—16.20 PASCAL ENGEL, "Asserting, Asking and the Norm of Knowledge"
16.20—16.50 Coffee Break
16.50—18.00 CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, "Questions, Problems, Inquiries"
18.00 Conference End

Philosophers' Carnival # 44

... is here.

ANU

Exciting news: I am going to ANU next year. They offered me a Research Fellowship in connection with David Chalmers' "The Contents of Consciousness" project. I am really looking forward to joining this excellent program.

1-Intensions and Strict Epistemic Possibility

Here is a problem I have been struggling with for the last couple of weeks. Suppose we assign the following truth-conditions to 'for all S knows, p might be the case'.

'For all S knows, p might be the case' is true iff there is a scenario v such that v is compatible with what S knows, and the 1-intension of 'p' is true at v.

For simplicity's sake, suppose scenarios are sets of enriched propositions, and suppose a scenario v is compatible with what S knows iff every enriched proposition in v has a 1-intension that is compatible with the 1-intensions of S's knowledge mental states.

This account seems to give us the right result in the simple cases. Suppose I don't know that water is H20. Then there is a scenario, namely the XYZ scenario, which is compatible with what I know and in which the 1-intension of 'water is not H20' is true.

But, now, here is the problem. Suppose I use 'water' and 'H20' interchangeably but fail to know that this is so. Then, since I do not know that I use 'water' and 'H20' interchangeably, it is plausible that I do not know that water is H20. So, it is strictly epistemically possible for me that water is not H20. But, as I use 'water' and 'H20' interchangeably, it is not deeply epistemically possible for me that water is not H20. In other words, 'water is not H20' is compatible with what I know but not compatible with my use of the words 'water' and 'H20'.

The problem now is this. The account of strict epistemic possibility just offered makes use of the notion of 1-intension. However, the 1-intension of a sentence S is a function from deeply epistemically possible scenarios to truth-values (see David Chalmers' work on this). As strictly epistemically possible propositions may be deeply epistemically impossible, the notion of 1-intension should not play a role in an account of strict epistemic possibility. But how then do we deal with strict epistemic possibility? I am pretty much stuck here. Any suggestions?

Alexandrova Accepts Offer

Exciting news: Anna Alexandrova turned down the post doc at Wash U and accepted the position at UMSL instead.

Ernie Lepore on the Heresy of Paraphrase

Ernie Lepore gave a super-interesting talk at SLU Thursday. The talk was about the heresy of translation. According to the heresy, when a poem is translated, something gets lost in translation. As Lepore pointed out, there seems to be a simple refutation of the heresy (I am quoting from the handout):

Suppose someone utters the sentence S in a poem. If S is meaningful, then it expresses a thought or an idea or a proposition or whatever -- call what it expresses p. Why couldn't another sentence S' be introduced to express p, regardless of whether it occurs in a poem or in a patch of prose?

The idea is this. We ought to be able to express the content of a poem in a different language. Just translate the poem word for word, and you should be able to preserve the content. Yet it surely seems that something got lost along the way. Lepore thinks that what gets lost is what he calls 'the vehicle of articulation'. To see the difference between an expression and a vehicle of articulation, consider the following sentences (from Lepore):

(1) 'red' is an English word

(2) 'red' is one word in English, another in Danish, and none in Italian

In (1) 'red' is an English word, in (2) it is a vehicle of articulation which expresses a color word in English, a past tensed verb in Danish, etc. The vehicle of articulation is different from the expression. Vehicles articulate expressions. Expressions have semantic values, vehicles don't.

Now, some expressions can only be expressed with one vehicle. Quotation expressions, for example, cannot pick out different things. Unless you use a name (e.g. 'Jason') to refer to 'Quine', 'Quine' can only be expressed with "Quine". "Quine" carries the semantic value with it. That is, the thing we quote is contained in the quotation expression. According to Lepore, quoted expressions create hyperintensional contexts. Consider, for instance:

(3) 'bachelor' is the first word in 'bachelors are unmarried men'

(4) 'unmarried man' is the first word in 'bachelors are unmarried men'

Even though 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are synonyms, substitution is illegitimate in a quotation context. According to Lepore, poetry is in important ways similar to quoted expressions. If you substitute a synonym for a word in a poem, something may get lost. Like quoted expressions, poems create hyperintensional contexts. Substitution into the context of a poem is illegitimate. Lepore concluded that the heresy got things exactly right. Some poetry is not simply about the content but is about the vehicle of articulation. For this reason, poetry can only be translated with great difficulty, and something usually gets lost.

On Adam's Counterexample to Modus Tollens

Ernest W. Adams famously offered the following counterexample to modus tollens:

If it rained, it didn't rain hard.
It rained hard.
So, it didn't rain.

Obviously, this is not a counterexample, given a logic 101 reading of the indicative conditional. Rather, it is a counterexample, given an intuitive assignment of truth-values to the premises and the conclusion. On an intuitive assignment, it seems that 'if it rained, it didn't rain hard' and 'it rained hard' may both be true. But the conclusion seems false, given the premises.

Notice that we get the same result with a subjunctive instead of an indicative:

Should it rain, it won't rain hard.
It is raining hard.
So, it is not raining.

The subjunctive in the first premise is a so-called future subjunctive, which differs pragmatically from the past and pluperfect subjunctives, for example the past and pluperfect subjunctives introduce a counterfactual implicature). With a future subjunctive, the argument seems invalid. But the appearance is an illusion. If it is raining hard in reality, it is not true that it doesn't rain hard at the closest worlds at which it rains. For the closest worlds at which it rains will include the actual world. So, if the second premise is true, then the first premise is false. Now, on a possible world account of the indicative conditional, Adams' argument fails for the very same reasons. I take that to be a virtue of a possible worlds analysis of indicative conditionals. But obviously more needs to be said about how to avoid certain problems that arise on a possible worlds analysis of the indicative.

Here is one such problem: if subjunctives and indicatives have the same truth-conditions, why is 'if Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, someone else did' acceptable when 'if Oswald hadn't killed Kennedy, someone else would have' is not? Edgington suggested that the difference turns on a difference in the tenses. I think that story is plausible.

Another problem is to account for the difference between pairs of conditionals such as 'If Kerry had won the election, the actual U.S. president would have been a democrat', which seems false, and 'if Kerry won the election, the actual U.S. president is a democrat', which seems true. Solutions have been suggested by e.g. David Chalmers, Brian Weatherson and Daniel Nolan. Weatherson and Nolan suggest that the evaluation world (the "A-world") may fix the reference of the expressions in indicative conditionals. That's an interesting idea but it does seem to have some odd implications. For example, 'If language didn't exist 80,000 years ago, then language existed 80,000 years ago' comes out true. Chalmers' two-dimensional account seems to fare better, as it avoids this consequence. On his account, language doesn't have to exist at the scenarios used to evaluate indicative conditionals.

Reference:
Adams, E. W. "Modus Tollens Revisited", Analysis 48 (1988) 122-128.

Links

Joe reports on some riots in Copenhagen.

Joe also has a new post on the old puzzle: if you were to call a horse's tail a 'leg', how many legs would a horse have? I especially enjoyed the picture of the five-legged horse.

Jonathan Ichikawa has an interesting post on apriori metaphysical possibility over at the Splintered Mind.

Arkansas' Sibilant 's' (Salerno)

Do you have good grammar? Not so much? You can always become an Arkansas lawmaker and change grammar. I quote from NPR today that

Rep. Steve Harrelson, a Democrat in the Arkansas legislature, yesterday introduced a resolution to declare the correct way to write the possessive form of the state's name. That would be, he says, "Arkansas's." ... Not everyone agrees, however, including the largest newspaper in Little Rock, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette. The daily stands by the Associated Press stylebook, which mandates that the state's possessive form is Arkansas'

There, see? The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette says he's wrong. Nice correction NPR!

PHINEWS Bulletin, February 2007

(1) PHINEWS / Volume 10 is scheduled to be published in April 2007. Deadline for submissions is March 15, 2007; Please send your annoucements and other relevant material to Vincent F. Hendricks, vincent@ruc.dk.

(2) SYNTHESE ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Synthese hosts its first annual conference Between Logic and Intuition: David Lewis and the Future of Formal Methods in Philosophy at the Carlsberg Academy in Copenhagen, October 3- 5 , 2007.

Invited Speakers: John Collins, Alan Hajek, Hannes Leitgeb, Rohit Parikh and L.A. Paul

Call for Papers - Deadline April 1, 2007

Synthese invites papers on the work of David Lewis and formal philosophy in accordance with the conference abstract. The final papers should be submitted electronically directly to editor-in-chief Vincent F. Hendricks, vincent@ruc.dk, classified as a "SAC"-submission in the subject entry. The deadline for submitting a paper for consideration is April 1, 2007. Notification of acceptance for presentation at the conference is August 1, 2007

(via Vincent Hendricks)

Two New Danish Blogs

... new to me anyway. One is Anders Schoubye's Legenden.dk -- a blog which has actually been around since 2002 (long before I started mine). Anders was just accepted as a graduate student at UCLA and is interested in definite descriptions, presupposition-failure and other exciting topics. The other is Klemens Kappel's Klemens Kappel's Blog (very fitting name!). Klemens is an associate professor at University of Copenhagen. Unfortunately (for you English-speaking (only) readers), the language of Klemens' blog is Danish. So, you (English-speaking readers) will have to wait for my occasional reports. Anyway, in spite of the fact that both of these topnotch philosophers are Danish, I have never had a beer with them in Copenhagen (likely explanation: it's 11 years -- yes, 11 years -- since I left the country). Actually, I never met Anders (but I am looking forward to meeting him at the Aberdeen epistemology conference in May, which he has promised to show up for!). I know Klemens from conferences, and he is definitely one of my favorite epistemologists. Hopefully, I will bump into him again soon.

Offer Out to Alexandrova

Exciting news: we have an offer out to Anna Alexandrova, who just completed her Ph.D. at UC San Diego. I very much hope she will accept the offer. She currently holds a post doc position at Wash U and has also taught a course for us last year. Her reasearch area falls within the broad area of formal philosophy, though with a special focus on philosophy of economics. This is an area of philosophy which I was hoping to learn more about. Now that may happen in a quite natural fashion.

Bush Funneling Money to al Qaeda-Related Groups

From Truthout:

Seymour Hersh reports that the Bush administration is funding anti-Shiite Sunnis linked to al Qaeda without Congressional approval and without appropriate appropriation. Hersh speculates that the money is coming from the pallet-loads of cash floating around Iraq and has already reached "three Sunni jihadist groups." He says, flatly, that the president is "supporting groups indirectly that are involved with the same people that did 9/11."

Resistant Counterpossibles

A quick follow-up on Joe's kangaroo post (I couldn't resist). In his forthcoming book The Philosophy of Philosophy Timothy Williamson defends the view that all counterpossibles are true, including:

If Hillary Clinton had been my mother, she wouldn't have been my mother.

and

If the law of excluded middle had failed, 'p or not-p' would have been true.

Williamson then writes as follows (symbols have been translated into English):

If all counterpossible were false, 'possibly-A' would be equivalent to 'if A had been the case, A would have been the case', for the latter would still be true whenever A was possible; correspondingly, 'necessarily-A' would be equivalent to the dual 'not-(if not-A had been the case, then not-A would have been the case)' and one could carry out the programme of section 3 using the new equivalences.

As this is a counterpossible (if Williamson is right), what Williamson just said is true. But so is:

If all counterpossible were false, 'possibly-A' would NOT be equivalent to 'if A had been the case, A would have been the case', for the latter would still be FALSE whenever A was possible; correspondingly, 'necessarily-A' would NOT be equivalent to the dual 'not-(if not-A had been the case, then not-A would have been the case)' and [so] one could NOT carry out the programme of section 3 using the new equivalences.

I am not saying that counterpossibles are sometimes false. My only point is that the subjunctive mood is a common way in which to refute one's opponents in philosophy (perhaps the most common way), and so, if counterpossibles are true (per definition), philosophy isn't as deep and interesting as one would have thought.

Denmark to Withdraw From Iraq

From Truthout:

The Associated Press reports from Copenhagen of Denmark's plan to withdraw troops from Iraq. The Danish announcement came Wednesday as British Prime Minister Tony Blair said his country would withdraw about 1,600 troops in the coming months, if local forces can secure the southern part of the country.

Philosophers' Carnival # 43

... is here.

Rankings

In previous blog posts John Capps has argued that the PGR gives us a somewhat inaccurate picture of the quality of philosophy programs. He now appeals to the Faculty Scholarly Productivity Index to back up this claim. The FSPI measures productivity by the number of books and articles published and the number of citations. Given these parameters, the 10 highest ranking philosophy programs are:

1. Michigan State
2. CUNY
3. Princeton
4. U. of Virginia
5. Rutgers
6. UC San Diego
7. Penn State
8. UT Austin
9. SUNY Stony Brook
10. Rice

Capps notes that the list "doesn't look anything like the Leiter list". He also foreshadows an objection. The objection is that the PGR measures quality, whereas the FSPI measures quantity. Capps replies that citations are normally taken to be a good measure of quality. That's a good point. But I wonder whether the numbers cited by the FSPI are really accurate. According to the FSPI, only 20% of the faculty at Princeton and 28% of the faculty at Rutgers published an article in 2003-2005. Though I haven't checked, that seems unlikely. On the other hand, if there are mistakes, everyone is probably affected, and so that does not explain why the FSPI looks different from the PGR. So why does it look different? One possible answer is that there are numerous ways to measure the quality of a program. The FSPI clearly cannot measure originality or quality of articles as well as the PGR. Still, these data are quite interesting, and it might be a good idea for prospective Ph.D. students to compare the lists before deciding where to go. But students should also keep in mind that some prospective employers might consult the PGR rather than the FSPI before they decide whether or not to make an offer.

On McGee's Counterexample to Modus Ponens

McGee's counterexample to modus ponens came up in our reading group today at WashU during our discussion of Chapter 4 of Timothy Williamson's forthcoming book The Philosophy of Philosophy. The counterexample runs as follows. It's just before the election in 1980. The polls suggest that Republican Reagan is a clear winner. Democrat Carter is second, and Republican Anderson is third. Someone reasons as follows:

(1) If a Republican wins, then if it's not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson
(2) A Republican will win
(3) Therefore, if it's not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson.

Impeccable reasoning. Or maybe not. Intuitively, (1) and (2) are true, while (3) is false. Of course, if we force a logic 101 reading, then the reasoning is impeccable.

The counterexample is not a counterexample to modus ponens, given a reading of 'if ... then ...' as a material conditional. It is a counterexample to modus ponens, given an intuitive assignment of truth-values. Moreover, if we take the intuitive assignment of truth-values seriously, then it is a counterexample to the logic 101 reading.

But if 'if ... then ...' is not to be read as the material conditional, how is it to be read? A possible worlds account (ala the one for subjunctive conditionals) does not seem give us the intuitive result either. Without any further constraints on the closeness relation, a possible worlds analysis of (1) would tell us to go to the closest world in which a Republican wins. That is the actual world (as Reagan won). Then we go to the closest world in which it's not Reagan who wins. The closest world in which he doesn't win is one in which Anderson wins, if we keep the "Republican wins" feature fixed. So, (1) is true. (2), of course, is true. And so is (3) if we keep the "Republican wins" feature fixed. But this is not the intuitive result.

Why do we get a different result on an intuitive reading? Well, because there are two ways of determining closeness. If we keep the "Republican wins" feature fixed, we get one ordering of the worlds, and if we keep the "most likely to win if Reagan doesn't" feature fixed, we get another ordering of the worlds. If we keep the "Republican wins" feature fixed, Anderson wins if Reagan loses. If we keep the "most likely to win if Reagan doesn't" feature fixed, Carter wins if Reagan loses. The "most likely to win" feature would normally be more important, as it would normally be more salient. In the case of (3), for example, we keep the "most likely to win if Reagan doesn't" feature fixed, hence the false reading. In the case of (1) the "Republican wins" feature was just mentioned in the antecedent. That makes it more salient. So when we evaluate the embedded conditional, we keep it fixed, hence the true reading.

Now, there are of course numerous reasons to be suspicious of a possible worlds analysis of indicative conditionals. But at least the possible worlds analysis fares better than the logic 101 analysis in this particular case, as it is able to explain why modus ponens seems to fail.

Links

Wayne Riggs is hosting a conference on "Why Formal Epistemology?" on April 28-29, 2007. Participants: Luc Bovens, David Chalmers, Branden Fitelson, Alan Hajek, Jonathan Kvanvig, Adam Morton, Scott Sturgeon, and Paul Weirich (via Wayne Riggs).

Keith DeRose's has a new paper on Sly Pete and conditionals of deliberation, which can be found here.

There is an interesting post on Yablo’s Paradox, formal systems and incompleteness over at the Florida Student Philosophy Blog

Freedom & Neurobiology

John R. Searle, Freedom & Neurobiology -- Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power, Columbia University Press, 2007, 128pp., $24.50 (hbk), ISBN 0-231-13752-4.

Freedom and Neurobiology (FN) brings together two of the lectures John Searle gave at Sorbonne in the spring of 2001. One was a public lecture on political power. The other was a lecture on free will. The two lectures appeared in French in a book entitled Liberté et neurobiologie in 2004. The book was subsequently translated into Spanish, Italian, German and Chinese. FN comes with a 37 pages introduction which brings together the two themes. Both essays are written in the style that has characterized Searle's work for several years. Written with great clarity in expression, the essays begin with the fundamental issues (neurobiology and the Big Bang) and work their way up to such issues as freedom, collective intentionality and political power. Along the way the book makes several contributions to the free will debate and the dispute over the status of social reality.

In the first essay Searle formulates the problem of free will as a problem in neurobiology. According to Searle, the problem of free will boils down to the problem of answering the following questions: (1) 'What exactly are the neuronal processes that cause our conscious experiences', in particular, what are the processes that cause the 'active character of what we might call "volitional consciousness" '? (pp. 40-41), and (2) how do we explain the appearance of a gap between subsequent conscious states? Searle does not answer either question fully. Presuably only a neurobiologist/quantum theorist duo could do that. But he does give us reason to believe that these questions ought to be at the center of the debate concerning free will.

What makes the problem of free will a problem, says Searle, is that 'the conscious states are not experienced as sufficient to compel the next conscious state' (p. 43) There is an appearance of a gap in the causal chain. It is awareness of this gap that makes us think we have free will. As Searle puts it,

It is important to emphasize that the problem of free will, as I have stated it, is a problem about a certain kind of human consciousness. Without the conscious experience of the gap, that is, without the conscious experience of the distinctive features of free, voluntary, rational actions, there would be no problem of free will. We have the conviction of our own free will because of certain features of our consciousness.

This is a slight exaggeration, on Searle's part. For, as he subsequently points out, to say that there would be no problem of free will if we didn't experience the gap is not yet to say that the gap is not real. It could be that whatever precedes our actions is in every case sufficient to determine the action. But if it is not, then we are owed some account of how such gaps are possible in a largely deterministic world. Searle admits that there may be indeterminacy at the quantum level (p. 44). But the indeterminacy is often described as randomness, and randomness does not make for freedom in choice. Suppose I flip a coin before "deciding" whether to go to a bar in the Central West End or one in University City. I end up in University City. So do you. But unlike me, you weighed pros and cons -- your preference for walking home rather than driving settled the issue. Who is making a free decision in this case? Well, certainly not me.

What then is Searle's answer to the big question? After dismissing what he calls 'epiphenomenalism' -- the view that 'our experience of freedom plays no causal or explanatory role in our behavior' (p. 62) -- he argues that the brain 'causes and sustains' a conscious self which then engages in deliberations and reports its results to the brain. Finally, the brain moves the body. For Searle the self plays an important role in explaining our experience of the gap but the self is not something over and above the brain. As he puts it,

the self is not some extra entity; rather, in a very crude and oversimplified fashion, one can say that conscious agency plus conscious rationality equals selfhood. So if you had an account of brain processes that explained how the brain produced the unified field of consicousness, together with the experience of acting, and in addition how the brain produced consicous thought processes, in which the constraints of rationality are already built in as constitutive elements, you would ... get the self for free (p. 72).

So how does Searle's account differ from old-fashioned determinism? Is the account simply a form of compatibilism -- a theory that reconciles free will and determinism? It is not. While the self isn't some extra entity for Searle, the results of its deliberations are not caused by the brain. Searle thus assumes that there is a level of indeterminacy in decision-making. As quamtum indeterminacy is the only (known) kind of indeterminacy in nature, the indeterminacy in question can only be quantum indeterminacy. Searle points out that just because quantum indeterminacy is best described as randomness at the quantum level, this does not mean that the self's deliberation processes are also random. There can be radomness at the micro-level even if there is none at the macro-level. Searle concludes by noting that the hypothesis he has outlined is 'a mess' and that it seems to remove one mystery only to replace it with three others (free will, consciousness and quantum mechanics). Searle never says how quantum indeterminacy explains system indeterminacy. In spite of the inconclusiveness, the essay gives new structure to a very complicated debate without rehearsing all the tangents that have emerged in recent years. Moreover, it makes it absolutely clear where in the debate Searle stands: he is an old-fashioned indeterminist.

If you are already familiar with Searle's previously published books, in particular The Construction of Social Reality and Rationality in Action, the second essay will bring back old memories. The essay is about how political power supervenes on brute facts and collective intentionality. There is nothing mysterious about collective intentionality, according to Searle. If several organisms engage in an activity with consciously shared attitudes, there is collective intentionality. However, collective intentionality does not suffice for political reality. The institutional and political realms require what Searle calls 'status functions'. A status function is a function we impose upon an object by believing collectively that the object performs the function in question. Searle's favorite example is the one dollar bill. If we didn't believe that the one dollar bill had the value corresponding to the number printed on it, it would just be green paper. But the green paper is not just green paper, it functions as currency, and that function is a status function. Status functions are imposed on objects via constitutive rules of the form 'X counts as Y in context C'. According to Sarle, prominent or forceful individuals in a given social group initially impose the status functions. Then, slowly, the imposing becomes routine, and the practice then creates a constitutive rule. Searle thinks 'language is partly constitutive of all institutional reality' (p. 95). This makes institutional reality different from social reality (broadly construed). Within institutional reality, status functions exist only to the extent that we represent them as existing.

Now, as for political power, political power (and in particular governmental power), says Searle, is a system of status functions. It depends for its existence on collective acceptance (p. 97) When a system collapses, it is usually because the acceptance by a large number of people is withdrawn. One interesting feature of Searle's view is that he holds that political facts could not exist without language and armed violence. What makes it true that Bush is president is that enough people regard him as and accept him as president. And this they do by accepting the entire governmental system. But the governmental system would not remain in place if it were not 'backed by the threat of armed violence' (p. 108). It is only through the threat of armed violence that the government can be sustained as the ultimate system with ultimate power.

As noted at the outset, the essay on political power was intended as a public lecture. It does not deviate much from the theory Searle set out in the Construction of Social Reality and Rationality in Action. The essay raises important fundamental questions, such as 'what is a constitutive rule?', 'what makes social and political facts true?', 'how is a governmental system sustained?' A brief remark on the second question. On Searle's view, what makes it true that Bush is president is that we have imposed the president status function on Bush. He has the status function only insofar as we continue to believe that he has certain obligations and powers. But maybe this is overstating the role our alleged acceptance of Bush has in keeping him in place. Perhaps it is true that the continued acceptance of the governmental system is needed in order to sustain the government. And maybe it is also true that collectively we decided to impose a status function on Bush. But, it seems, the president status function is not sustained by our beliefs. Rather, it seems to be a role in a system that can be filled by different individuals. What characterizes the role is a collection of formal properties. What makes it true that Bush is president is that Bush fills the role. In this sense, the president status function is akin to numbers, it is a role in a larger system defined by its relations to other places in the order.

In sum: for those already familiar with Searle's philosophy, Freedom & Neurobiology introduces few new issues but it sheds light on old ones, and it clearly and concisely states Searle's views on a number of issues, including language, collective intentionality, free will, and the self.

Note: My colleague Gualtiero Piccinini was also asked to review the book for CUP. His review can be found here.


John Searle, the Free Speech Movement
--

Erdös Number 8

Richard Zach reports that the Mathematical Reviews database MathSciNet has an "Erdös Number calculator" in the author search. He calculated Jason Stanley's, which is 5. I looked up my own, which is 8:

Berit Brogaard coauthored with Barry Smith MR2224530
Barry Smith coauthored with Achille C. Varzi MR1693227 (2000e:03014)
Achille C. Varzi coauthored with Anthony G. Cohn MR1996110 (2004e:03021)
Anthony G. Cohn coauthored with Ernest S. Davis MR1716181 (2000k:68156)
Ernest S. Davis coauthored with Jeffrey M. Jaffe MR0677084 (84f:90042)
Jeffrey M. Jaffe coauthored with Michael Rodeh MR1025464 (90m:68019)
Michael Rodeh coauthored with Maria M. Klawe MR0668088 (84a:68026)
Maria M. Klawe coauthored with Paul Erdös MR0593526 (82c:05058)

As Zach points out, you can also calculate other numbers, for instance, your Stanley or Zach number. My Zach and Stanley numbers are both 10. So is my Carnap number. My Taski number, on the other hand, is 7, and my Quine number is 8.

'The President has been Assassinated 5 Times'

Some think worm theory is suspect because we rarely quantify over worms in ordinary language. However, consider the following sentences (from Carlson 1977):

(1) The president makes good decisions when he is from Ohio
(2) The president has eaten at the Statler Hilton on saturday nights every week for the past 25 years.
(3) The president inhabited the White House continuously for 136 years until Truman moved into Blair house.
(4) The president has been assassinated by a disgruntled job-seeker five times since the turn of the century.

(3) seems to assert that a four-dimensional spacetime worm to which the predicate 'president' applies lived in the White House for 136 years until one of its temporal parts moved into Blair house, and (4) seems to assert that a four-dimensional spacetime worm to which the predicate 'president' applies has been killed five times. Carlson himself treats bare plurals and definite descriptions used generically as terms referring to kinds. But (1) of course does not assert of a kind that it makes good decisions when it is from Ohio. To avoid this implication Carlson distinguishes between kind-level and characterizing predicates. Kind-level predicates are predicates such as 'is extinct' which apply to the kind itself (as in 'the dinosaur is extinct'). Characterizing predicates are predicates such as 'makes good decisions when he is from Ohio' which apply only to instances of the kind. It is not the kind that makes good decisions when it is from Ohio but the individuals that fall under it. Carlson treats kinds as basic but if kinds were mereological sums, as some philosophers think, his suggestion would be consistent with the thesis that ordinary language quantifies over worms.

Reference: Carlson, G. 1977. Reference to Kinds in English, Ph.D. thesis, UMass.

Papers

Two of my articles just appeared in print:

"Number Words and Ontological Commitment", The Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2007), 1-20.

"Span Operators", Analysis 67 (2007), 72-79.

The papers are available here.

I'm cool with that

From LanguageLog:



Mark Liberman points out that 'Holly's slang scholarship is weak', as 'I'm cool with that' was current in the 80s when the mother was a teen. He also points out that 'cool' was used as 'a general term of approval' all the way back in 1884. SWEEEEEEET!

The History of the APA

Over the last week or so I have been reading mostly old stuff (old for me anyway), mostly articles/book chapters by, and responses to, Rudolf Carnap and C. I. Lewis. But I've also read a couple of lightweight articles. One was Gardiner's "The First Twenty-Five Years of the American Philosophical Association", which was published in The Philosophical Review in 1926. As the article describes, the APA was an 'offshoot' from the American Psychological Association, from which it separated in 1901. The reason for the split was that the APA meetings prior to 1901 had become invaded by philosophers, which contradicted the mission statement of the APA, the mission being to advance 'psychology as a science'. At the APA meeting in 1899 one-third of the papers read were of a clearly philosophical nature. After a couple of unsuccessful attempts to establish a philosophical division of the APA, Professor Creighton from Cornell met privately with Seth, Irons, Hibben, and Thilly to talk about the possibility of an independent American Philosophical Association. The American Philosophical Association was formed at a meeting in New York on November 2, 1901, Creighton was elected president and the first meeting of the American Philosophical Association was held in Earl Hall, Columbia University, March 31 - April 1 during the Easter break the following year. 40 philosophers attended. The first APA smoker was hosted by Mrs. Butler -- president Butler's wife -- in the Avery Library. The first paper, "Poetry and Philosophy", on the rather full program was read by Ralph Barton Perry, and Creighton spoke to "the Purposes of a Philosophical Association" in his presidential address. He emphasized the importance of 'cooperation through discussion in the solution of philosophical problems', the philosopher being 'dependent on social stimulus' (Gardiner 1926: 149). The Proceedings of the APA were subsequently published in The Philosophical Review.

In 1901, after the foundation, invitations were sent out to universities and colleges. 67 philosophers joined the association, and 30 were elected. But not every one was thrilled by the thought of regular APA meetings. Thus, William James replied:

I am still pretty poorly and can't 'jine' anything -- but apart from that I don't foresee much good from a philosophical society. Philosophical discussion proper only succeeds between intimates who have learned how to converse by months of weary trial and failure. The philosopher is a lone beast dwelling in his individual burrow. -- Count me out! (Gardiner 1926: 148).

James must have changed his mind, for he joined the APA 3 years later and became its 6th president. The American Philosophical Society, which was founded by Benjamin Franklin in 1734, also objected to the foundation of the APA. They complained that 'the APA' was 'an infringement of title and liable to cause confusion with their own Society' (Gardiner 1926: 150). But the protest was ignored.

At the December meeting of the APA 1902 it was decided that the Western Philosophical Association, which had been founded in 1900, should become a division of the American Philosophical Association. But the APA continued to hold its meetings on the East Coast until 1914, where the APA met, for the first time, with the Western Division, in Chicago. But very few members from the East showed up. It was not until 1919 that the 'amalgamation' of the Eastern and Western divisions was successful. It was proposed that there should be one super-organization, the APA, and three Divisions: the Eastern, the Western and the Southern each of which would host separate meetings. It was also proposed that the super-organization should host a joint meeting. However, only one was ever held, in 1923. Moreover, Gardiner reports that 'there is no record that anything has come of the proposed inclusion of the Southern Association [which had been formed in the meantime] as a third Division' (1926: 153). Around the same time a society for Philosophy had formed on the West Coast, and it was suggested that this society should form the third Division of the APA.

By 1926 all the meetings of the APA, except for the first, had been held in December, and 250 papers had been read at these meetings. As for the quality of the papers, Gardiner makes the following remarks:

the papers have not always added greatly to our insight and ... discussion has at times seemed footless and fruitless. We have frequently been more bewildered than illuminated and sometimes, I have no doubt, we have felt frankly bored or irritated. But this may at least be said, we have reflected in our meetings the best thinking of American philosophers in our time. The future historian, inspecting our records, would be able to derive from them a not inaccurate conspectus of the state of philosophy in America in the first quarter of the century (1926: 157).

Gardiner adds that much has been gained as well 'by the cultivation of friendly personal relations among workers in the same or allied fields'.

Since 1926 the Western Division has familiarly become the Central Division, the Pacific Division has been formed, and the membership has gone up. The current membership of the APA is 10,400 (ASLS website).

More Pics from Arizona

David Chalmers has put up some great pics from the Arizona Ontology Conference. Brian Fiala, Andy Egan, Benj Hellie and Jessica Wilson, and Joe Salerno also took some pics. Small sample:


David Chalmers (background: Thomas Kelly and Jonathan Schaffer)



Delia Graff Fara with daughter Clarissa and Karen Bennett



Audience (foreground: Joe, Kris, Brad, Cian, Andy, Benj, Jessica)



Steffi Lewis, me and Helen Beebee

Philosophers' Carnival # 42

... is here.

Video Conferencing Instead of Interviewing

Pea Soup and American Philosophy both suggest doing APA interviewing through video conferencing instead of regular interviewing.

American Philosophy also has a post discussing Leiter's response to the article in New York Times about Rutgers.

Should I Become a Professional Philosopher?

'No', is the short answer offered at our yearly 'scare-away'- meeting whose intended audience is M.A. students eager to enter a Ph.D. program and become professional philosophers. The truth is that most philosophers who complete their doctorate and who are fortunate enough to land a permanent teaching job teach up to 3 or 4 courses per semester, they produce work of little importance which never gets cited or responded to, they earn less than 6 figures by the time they retire, and they spend most of their active years in the work force paying off the student loans they acquired at the mediocre Ph.D. program that ended up accepting them without funding. As my colleague Eric Wiland would put it, 'if you can imagine doing anything other than philosophy, do it'. I am not quite as pessimistic. But if you are an aspiring philosopher, you should know what you are getting yourself into. Philosophy is no paradise -- not always anyway. For the most part it is hard work disrupted by a noisy APA meeting full of flaky folks with no real life and then a very long summer break trying to meet deadlines which were postponed during the academic year. But there are also those rare occasions where you think (usually mistakenly) that you are onto something, or where the students are really getting what you have been trying to tell them for years. I tend to think those precious moments make it all worth it.

Acceptance Lecture By Vincent Hendricks

Vincent F. Hendricks was promoted to full professor on Januar 1, 2007 and will be giving an acceptance lecture on Friday March 9, 14:00 at Roskilde University, the Lecture Hall, Institute for Culture and Identity, Building 45, House 03.2.2. Hendricks was born in 1970 and attended, among other places, University of Copenhagen and Carnegie Mellon University. He received his doctoral degree in 1997 from University of Copenhagen and received the degree of dr. phil. from Aalborg University in 2004. His research has focused on the relationship among knowledge, logic and method, and he has published several books with Cambridge University Press, Springer and Oxford University Press.

Florida Students on Possible World Semantics

The Florida Student Blog has started an interesting discussion of possible world semantics.

Pictures from Arizona

Joe Salerno took some pictures at the Arizona Ontology Conference. They are available here.

Arizona 2007

Just returned from the Arizona Ontology Conference (see the announcement here). L.A. Paul did a fantastic job organizing it, and there was plenty of time for horseback riding and beautiful hikes. My horse Scooter had a lot of fun trying to get me off his back, and I had a lot of fun trying to stay on him. The papers were all excellent. There were virtually no talks, except for replies by commentators and Terry Horgan's magic tricks after dinner speech, but that left us with 75 minutes for discussion for each session. I am too tired to summarize all of the papers but let me mention a few.

Delia Graff Fara offered a new solution to the puzzle of contingent identity. The puzzle is to explain why

(1) Goliath is identical to Lumpl
(2) But Goliath might not have been identical to Lumpl

both seem true. Fara suggested that we should treat names as disguised predicates. At the level of logical form 'Delia Graff' functions as the "incomplete" definite description 'the Delia Graff'. As she treats definite descriptions as uniqueness-involving predicate nominals, 'the Delia Graff' naturally functions as a predicate nominal on her view. Treating names as predicates does not by itself solve the puzzle of contingent identity, as predicate names may be rigid. However, Fara assumes that predicate names may be non-rigid.

The logical forms of (1) and (2) may then be represented (informally) as follows.

(1*) [The] Goliath is identical to [the] Lumpl
(2*) It is possible that ([the] Goliath is not [the] Lumpl)

or:

(2**) [The] Goliath is such that it is possible that (it is not [the] Lumpl)

But not:

(2***) [The] Goliath and [the] Lumpl are such that it is possible that (they are not identical).

Since predicate names are non-rigid, contingency puzzles do not arise. Nor do substitution puzzles, as Leibniz’s Law does not apply when the designators involved are non-rigid.

My comments on Fara's paper can be found here.

David Chalmers argued that we should be anti-realists about ontological disputes. On Chalmers' view, there are worlds with micro-physical facts. But worlds do not come equipped with domains of quantification. Instead when we utter a sentence such as 'this is a chair' or 'this is a cup-cup' the context of utterance supplies a funishing function -- a function from worlds to domains. In ordinary contexts the furnishing functions may yield domains with chairs and cups but no cup-cups, and in the ontology room the furnishing functions may yield domains with cup-cups, or alternatively no cups and no chairs. There are various admissibility constraints on the furnishing functions. 'There are unicorns' is inconsistent with a semantically neutral description of the micro-physical level of reality. So, it is not correct in any (actual) context to say that there are unicorns. Jonathan Schaffer replied with various sharp observations. Among other things, he argued that Chalmers' version of quantifier domain restriction could be assimilated to ordinary quantifier domain restriction. My pre-conference questions (and Chalmers' replies) can be found here.

Ted Sider discussed presentism, a Williamsonian passage view and two versions of the growing block view in light of the notion of saturation. Roughly, a proposition is saturated iff its truth (or falsehood) does not depend on any parameters or perspectives. So, for the presentist, the passager, and other A-theorists, the proposition expressed by my current utterance of the sentence 'Brit is sitting' is saturated. Agustin Rayo offered sharp and colorful comments. Among other things, he was wondering whether we should take a reference-first approach (Sider) or a truth-conditions-first approach to language. I tried to argue that the Williamsonian passage-view might require us to index to times. Roughly, on the passage view, 'it was the case that there is a time t which will never be present, and dinosaurs exist at t' entails 'there is an x such that it was the case that x is a time which will never be present and dinosaurs exist at x'. So, if x is a time now, then we have two times: the present time and x. So, how do we avoid indexing?

Kathrin Koslicki rejected moderate composition as identity. Objects, on her view, are not composed of their parts, as part-indiscernible objects can differ in virtue of their structure. Kris McDaniel asked a number of challenging questions, for instance, what are we to say about chair-shaped extended simples? Such unbreakable chairs have no internal structure.

Cian Dorr offered the beginning of a new interpretation of quantum mechanics. It was a difficult paper, and in spite of the fact that Jill North explained the most difficult parts of the paper in her excellent commentary, I do not have the courage to offer a summary here.

There were lots of other very interesting papers and commentaries, including papers by Helen Beebee (comments: Terry Horgan), Carolina Sartorio (comments: Michael Fara), Ned Hall (comments: Antony Eagle), and Sarah McGrath (comments: Mark Heller).

More discussions of papers and pictures from the conference will follow soon, I am sure (UPDATE: Joe Salerno took some pics. They are available here. For more info see the original post).

Vincent Hendricks Meets Johannes Møllehave

On February 4, 2007 at 20:35 the Danish DK4 channel features an interview with Vincent Hendricks by Johannes Møllehave -- Denmark’s most celebrated priest, critic and literary figure. Hendricks is Professor of Formal Philosophy at Roskilde University in Copenhagen and editor-in-chief of the journal Synthese.

UPDATE: Hendricks was promoted to full professor on Januar 1, 2007. He will be giving an acceptance lecture on Friday March 9, 14:00 at Roskilde University, the Lecture Hall, Institute for Culture and Identity, Building 45, House 03.2.2.

Florida Student Philosophy Blog

Graduate and undergraduate students in the state of Florida have started a new blog, Florida Student Philosophy Blog, which is well worth checking out.

Hillary for President?

From Truthout.

Cindy Sheehan writes:

This occupation of Iraq can't be won by being smarter - it was lost before we went in. The US, again, was a big loser in a capricious military expedition, with the support of Senator Clinton. She is an amazingly brilliant person, and she cannot say that she was fooled by George. We, the American public, can be brilliant too, and we can't buy that baloney.

Feministing

Here's a blog that you should know about.

Hiatus

I am off to Arizona. Lemmings will be fairly quiet until I am back.

Sex, Singer and Ali G (Salerno)

[Cross-posted from KNowAbiliTy]

Peter Singer reminds us here that sex with humans is a lot more fun. And Ali G has something to say about animal rights as well.

Reasons for Non-Selection of Job Candidates

If you are on the job market, you might wonder why you didn't get an initial interview or a follow-up interview with a particular school. At my school official non-selection criteria are used. Here are the most important ones (slightly reformulated so as not to step on any administrator's toes).

(1) Degree-granting institution not as strong in the field as those of the candidates selected.
(2) Candidate accepatable but candidates selected have more/better publications.
(3) Insufficient publication record considering the length of time.
(4) Reseach/Publications not appropriate to position as advertized.
(5) Area of specialization overlaps significantly with those of current members of the department and/or does not fit with the needs of the department as advertized.
(6) History of difficult interpersonal relationships.
(7) Dissertation not completed and insufficient evidence that it will be by the end of the year.
(8) Degree in a field not compatible with the needs of the department as advertized.

A note is added to the effect that (1) should be applied cautiously for females whose choice of school was dependent on her spouse's career, because - as they say - in such cases the candidate may not have had the 'luxury of choosing a top-ranked school for her work'.

I couldn't resist quoting the last part. I find the suggestion as such rather crude in its formulation. As for the selection criteria: they would have made it possible to reject Wittgenstein. But of course that is consistent with the views of both parties in the current debate.

Stanley vs. McGlynn

Jason Stanley and Aidan McGlynn have started a very interesting debate over whether Wittgenstein could have passed the tenure requirements at a current elite university. The main posts by Stanley can be found here and here. McGlynn replies to Stanley here and here. Carrie Jenkins expresses a third point of view here.

From the APA

Since I am obviously failing to make good on my promise to report from the APA, I am glad others are making up for it. Aidan McGlynn has a new report here, which (among other things) includes a brief summary of the Cappelen/Stanley session.

Some Papers

I have posted new drafts of the following papers to my website.

The first are my comments on Delia Graff Fara's paper at the Arizona Ontology Conference. It includes a quick reply to an objection Chalmers raised.

The second is my paper on Sharvy's theory of descriptions.

The third is my paper from the recent APA meeting. I still haven't fully replied to one of Zoltan Szabo's objections. So revisions will be made.

UPDATE: When I posted the APA paper I didn't reinsert the acknowledgement. That has now been corrected.

Comments on Graff Fara's Paper

I have uploaded a rough draft of my comments on Graff Fara's super-interesting paper for the Arizona Ontology Conference to my website. In the comments I briefly outline an epistemic solution to the problem of contingent identity. But, as Chalmers has just pointed out to me, it is not obvious that sentences involving subjunctive conditionals such as 'Goliath is identical to Lumpl but if I broke off his finger he wouldn't be' can be handled in this way. The puzzle of contingent identity: (1) and (2) seem true.

(1) Goliath is identical to Lumpl.

(2) But Goliath might not have been identical to Lumpl.

But they can't be if identity is absolute, and names are rigid. I suggest that the modality in (2) is (deeply) epistemic.

UPDATE: Formula (4) didn't go through. It should be: (x)(y)(x = y --> <>(x is not identical to y) iff <>(y is not identical to y)).

Philosophers' Carnival # 41

... is here.

Wiki Journal Info

Douglas Portmore has started a new wiki site which evaluates philosophy journals (HT: Weatherson).

Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions

Just a quick note relating to Chalmers' Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions (PA), which can be found here. In (PA) Chalmers defends a new approach to attitude ascriptions. Roughly: an utterance of 'S believes that p' is true iff S endorses a proposition q that is relevantly connected to p. q is relevantly connected to p iff p and q determine the same 2-intension, and q determines a p-relevant 1-intension. The 2-intension part is introduced in order to deal with cases of the following sort:

(1) Twin-Oscar believes water tastes good.

Suppose I utter (1). There is a feeling that (1) is false even if Twin-Oscar truly enjoys the clear non-alcoholic liquid in his glass. After all, Twin-Oscar is surrounded by XYZ and not H20. But if belief operators operated only on 1-intensions, then (1) would be true.

The account seems right to me. But I am wondering about:

(2) It is a priori for Twin-Oscar that water (if it exists) is the clear liquid in rivers and lakes.

Intuitively, (2) is false if uttered by me. Twin-Oscar is surrounded by XYZ not H20. But if deeply epistemic operators operate on 1-intension, as suggested by Chalmers, then (2) should be true (since the 1-intension of the operand sentence is necessary for Twin-Oscar). Now, I am aware that Chalmers has recently introduced some entertainability clause into his account of the a priori. But the operand sentence in (2) is entertainable (recall that I am the utterer, not Twin-Oscar). So it would seem that we need deeply epistemic operators to operate on something other than just 1-intension. Perhaps the following simple amendment might work: A's utterance of 'It is a priori for S that p' is true iff the 2-intension of 'p' (in the mouth of A) is true at the world of S, and the 1-intension of 'p' is necessary for S.

Chalmers on Ontological Anti-Realism

Today I read Carrie Jenkin's interesting post and David Chalmers' equally interesting paper -- very quickly on a very bumpy flight. But let me try to summarize Chalmers' paper (leaving out a whole bunch of important details). The paper begins with a discussion of ontological disputes. Here is one: there is a table with two cups. Is there in addition to the two cups also a cup-cup -- the fusion of the two cups? Here is another: there are some atoms arranged chair-wise. Is there in addition to the atoms also a chair? Realists in the relevant disputes would tend to say 'yes'. Chalmers is an anti-realist. His new position -- as I understand it on a quick read -- is this. There are worlds with micro-physical facts. But worlds do not come equipped with domains of quantification. Instead when we utter a sentence such as 'this is a chair' or 'this is a cup-cup' the context of utterance supplies a funishing function -- a function from worlds to domains. In ordinary contexts the furnishing functions may yield domains with chairs and cups but no cup-cups, and in the ontology room the furnishing functions may yield domains with cup-cups or alternatively no cups and no chairs. There are various admissibility constraints on the furnishing functions. 'There are unicorns' is inconsistent with a semantically neutral description of the micro-physical level of reality. So, it is not correct in any (actual) context to say that there are unicorns.

Some questions:
(1) Chalmers assimilates his quantifier domain restriction approach to other more well-known forms of quantifier domain restriction. But it is well-known that different occurrences of quantified noun phrases in one and the same sentence can be restricted in different ways. Stanley and Williamson offer this example: "every sailor waived to every sailor', which may be used to make a true assertion if the sailors on one ship waived to the sailors on another ship. I wonder whether there could also be different furnishing functions relative to different elements of a sentence or discourse fragment. Suppose I say "There are just two objects on the table unless we include the fusion of the cups". What I said may well be correct. But 'there are just two objects on the table' must then be associated with one furnishing function and 'the fusion of the cups' with another. Furnishing functions would then be specific to the occurrences of quantified noun phrases and not to the conversational context as such.

(2) This takes us to my second question. Are the furnishing functions values of function variables which are represented syntactically? Or do they enter into the analysis at a different level? On Stanley and Szabo's quantifier domain restriction strategy, the domain and function variables are represented syntactically. Since Chalmers assimilates his approach to other more well-known forms of quantifier domain restriction, one might suspect that the function variables are represented syntactically.

(3) If the function variables are represented syntactically, how do we deal with cases of the following sort? 'Each journal editor told each referee to reject each paper' (See Schlenker 2005, Mind & Language for similar examples)

(4) On a different note: are there in fact two kinds of quantifiers? Those ranging over the micro-physical domain (that is, those occurring in a semantically neutral description of a world) and those ranging over domains yielded by the furnishing functions? If so, then why isn't this a form of ontological realism?

I have a number of additional questions. But I will save them for later. I still need to read the paper more carefully.

APA 2006

A note on my own talk at the APA, which Paul Pietroski chaired. It was a fun session (even though most of us had slept very little the night before because of the fire). Stanley, Graff Fara, Sayball and others in the audience offered constructive criticism, and Zoltan Szabo, my commentator, provided neat comments. I basically defended a new partitive account of plural definite descriptions. Sentences such as 'the students asked questions' cause trouble for a "standard" Russellian account of plural definite descriptions. This is because on a Russellian account of plural definite descriptions, a sentence such as 'the students asked questions' ought to come out as equivalent to 'all the students asked questions'. But it seems that the sentence could be true even if only a handful of students asked questions. I argued that a Russellian analysis is correct at a primary level of analysis but that plural definites function as partitives at a subsequent level. So, at a subsequent level of analysis, 'the students asked questions' might come out as 'some of the students asked questions'. Zoltan was happy with an amended version of the partitive account but argued that plural definite descriptions do not involve a maximality implication (at the primary level of analysis). His main counterexample to the Russellian account:

(1) Two men entered the room with five others. The two men took off their hats and handed them to one of the others.

It seems that (1) may be true. But on the Russellian account it would appear to be contradictory. I am still thinking about a proper response. But, as Zoltan pointed out, there is also the possibility of accepting his (and Ludlow and Segal and others') unitary account in conjunction with my partitive account. That way we can both have what we need (as he put it) -- and perhaps we can both have what we want as well.

My paper (which is forthcoming in Mind and Language) is available here. A revised version will be uploaded soon.

Call for Papers: David Lewis

Between Logic and Intuition: David Lewis and the Future of Formal Methods in Philosophy: Conference at the Carlsberg Academy in Copenhagen, October 3- 5 , 2007.

Invited Speakers / John Collins, Hannes Leitgeb, Rohit Parikh, L.A. Paul, Brian Weatherson

Program Committee and Conference Chairs / Johan van Benthem, Vincent F. Hendricks, John Symons (SYNTHESE) , Stig Andur Pedersen (PHIS)

Conference Manager / Pelle Guldborg Hansen

Call for papers / Synthese invites papers on the work of David Lewis and formal philosophy in accordance with the conference abstract. The final papers should be sent electronically to Editor-in-Chief, Vincent F. Hendricks at vincent@ruc.dk, using "SAC"-submission in the subject entry. The deadline for submitting a paper for consideration is April 1, 2007. Notification of acceptance for presentation at the conference is August 1, 2007.

Publication / A selection of the best papers will be published as an anthology in the Synthese Library book series.

(via Joe Salerno)

Call for Papers: Applied Stochastic Models

This a call for abstract submission (deadline Jan. 25, 2007) for the 12th International Conference on Applied Stochastic Models and Data Analysis (ASMDA 2007), which will take place in Chania, Crete, Greece (May 29 - June 1, 2007).

The ASMDA Conferences are organized every two years starting 25 years ago with the first ASMDA Symposium organized in Brussels, Belgium (1981). The papers presented are included in special volumes. The best papers appear in special issues of the leading journals of the ASMDA field.

Further information at the Conference Website. You can also download a conference poster at the same web site. (Deadline for Abstract Submission and Special Session proposal January 25, 2007).

(via Christos H. Skiadas)

Images of Hanging Make Hussein a Martyr

From Truthout:

In the week since Saddam Hussein was hanged in an execution steeped in sectarian overtones, his public image in the Arab world, formerly that of a convicted dictator, has undergone a resurgence of admiration and awe. At the heart of the sudden reversal of opinion was the symbolism of the hasty execution, now framed as an act of sectarian vengeance shrouded in political theater and overseen by the American occupation.

Read more here.

Dancing Queen

Just went to see the Broadway musical Mamma Mia! The performances and the music were fantastic. The plot: 20-year old Sophie (Carey Anderson) is getting married. Having never known the identity of her father, Sophie invites to her wedding three men mentioned in her mother's diary. The 23 hit songs by Benny Andersson and Björn Ulvaeus from the Swedish pop-group ABBA rocked the house. If you are in the City and need a break before classes start, I can definitely recommend going.

UPDATE (some pics): subway; with lead actress Carey Anderson; on Broadway stage with bodyguard and Joe's sister Holly.

Call for Papers: Applying Peirce

An International Conference on Peirce's Thought and Its Applications, 11-13 June 2007.
University of Helsinki, Finland
Organized in conjunction with the 9th World Congress of the International
Association of Semiotic Studies.
http://www.helsinki.fi/peirce/2007/

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Program Committee cordially invites papers on any topic in accordance with
the theme of the conference. The Committee is especially interested in
proposals that explore the applicability of Peirce's thought to current
questions and problems in various disciplines.

The conference will include special sessions on Peirce and
* logic
* abductive reasoning (invited speakers in this session: Lorenzo Magnani and
Ilkka Niiniluoto)
* communication and rhetoric

Other suitable topics include the use and applicability of Peirce's thought in
* contemporary philosophical debates
* mathematics
* artificial intelligence
* cognitive science
* linguistics
* literary studies
* the study of fine arts and design
* physics
* biology
* psychology
* sociology
* anthropology

Keynote and plenary speakers include Nathan Houser (Peirce Edition Project,
IUPUI) and Jaakko Hintikka (Boston University). In addition to contributed
papers, the Conference will include invited talks, special sessions and a
workshop on the editing of Peirce's writings.

SUBMISSION DETAILS

Deadline for abstracts of 300-500 words is 15 February 2007. Submissions
are
made electronically by email attachment to peirce-research@helsinki.fi, and
must include two files:

* A file titled Abstract, including the title and abstract of the paper,
set up for anonymous review.
* A separate file titled Author including the title and author
information, including email address. Please include a note on any AV needs
you may have in this file.
The file formats .pdf, .rtf and .doc are preferable. You will be sent a
confirmation note after your submission has been received. If you have not
received a confirmation in seven days after your submission, please resend,
if possible, using an alternative email address.

All persons making a submission will be notified of the acceptance to the
Conference program by 31 March 2007.

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Vincent Colapietro (Chair)
André De Tienne
Leila Haaparanta
Risto Hilpinen
Robert Innis
Jørgen Dines Johansen
Lorenzo Magnani
Cheryl Misak
Ilkka Niiniluoto
Jaime Nubiola
María Lucia Santaella
John Sowa

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (Chair)
Henrik Rydenfelt (Secretary)
Merja Bauters
Mats Bergman
Erkki Kilpinen
Tarja Knuuttila
Pentti Määttänen
Sami Paavola
Sami Pihlström

The conference is arranged by the Helsinki Peirce Research Centre and
sponsored by the Charles S. Peirce Society and the Philosophical Society of
Finland. For more information, please email to peirce-research@helsinki.fi.
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (Department of Philosophy; P.O. Box 9, FIN-00014;
University of Helsinki; Finland).

(via Sami Paavola)

The Eastern APA

Just returned from a very strange Eastern APA. A fire in the main conference hotel kept the smoker going until 8 am in the morning. Most of us had talks and other business going on the next morning but at least we managed to shower, put on some wet clothes and air-dry the handouts. Anyway, there were very many very good talks on the program. I don't have the time or inclination to offer summaries presently, as I am still traveling but when I return I will try to catch up. In the meantime there are several interesting summaries of talks over at Knowability and The Boundaries of Language. Personally I really enjoyed Herman Cappelen and Jason Stanley's session on context-sensitivity, which I accidentally chaired (as a substitute for Peter Ludlow, who missed out on all the fun).

UPDATE: As Gil Harman points out over at TAR. 3 fires have now occurred in the hotel where the recent APA meeting was held. Click here to read more.

Arizona Ontology Conference 2007

The conference website for the Arizona Ontology Conference, Jan 17-21 2007, is now up, here. The papers are password protected but you may be able to find versions of the papers on people's websites. Speakers include: Ted Sider, Helen Beebee, Carolina Sartorio, Delia Graff Fara, Ned Hall, Caroline West, David Chalmers, John Hawthorne, Cian Dorr, Sarah McGrath and Kathrin Koslicki. Commentators: Agustin Rayo, Terry Horgan, Michael Fara, Brit Brogaard, Antony Eagle, Krista Lawlor, John Divers, Jill North, Mark Heller, and Kris McDaniel. A full list of participants can be found here.

John Searle: Freedom & Neurobiology

John Searle's very interesting-looking Freedom & Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power is out. Here is a brief description from the press (CUP):

The essays that comprise this volume return to some of the crucial issues that have defined Searle's work: language, consciousness, free will, and social ontology and political power. Searle proposes new ways of thinking about these issues and addresses how recent scientific discoveries have shaped philosophical understandings of the mind and consciousness. In the first essay, "Free Will as Problem in Neurobiology," Searle examines key philosophical issues in the context of recent discoveries in neurobiology. Searle then applies his theory of social reality to the problem of political power, explaining the role of language in the formation of our political reality.

There is also an excerpt available here.

Philosophers' Carnival # 40

... is here.