From now on, you will also see me over at New APPS: Art, Politics, Philosophy, Science. I really look forward to being part of this excellent team of bloggers. You can read my first post here.
Friday, September 23, 2011
New APPS: Art, Politics, Philosophy, Science
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Wednesday, September 21, 2011
Social Deviancy, the Law, and Society
By guest blogger Allison Gamble
Deviance and criminal behavior are closely linked concepts in modern thought, although they are not always the same in practice. While the average man on the street may assume deviant behavior is also criminal, in terms of forensic psychology this simply isn't the case. While the categories often overlap, it's possible to be a deviant without being a criminal, or to be a criminal without being socially deviant. 
Deviant Behavior, Society, and Social Sanction
Deviant behavior violates what society considers acceptable, while criminal behavior violates the law of that society. The average person sees deviance as behavior not in accordance with the standards of “proper” behavior in society. 
Social deviance may include any of the following behaviors:
• Refusing to respect social norms of polite behavior. 
This can range from being rude to others to refusing to offer respect to social icons. In general, this sort of behavior brands adherents as standing outside what the majority sees as the acceptable bounds of social activity. 
• Unpopular political or religious beliefs. 
Minority social or political groups often fall into this category, especially during times of social or ethnic tension. Examples in the United States include abolitionist activists in the Antebellum South, as well as Catholics during the mid- and late-19th century. 
• Defying normal class and gender roles. 
Early feminists and civil rights advocates often found themselves accused of social deviancy for transgressing against the accepted standards of behavior as it applied to gender and ethnicity.
 
• Engaging in activities harmful to others. 
Murder, theft, rape, and other transgressions that have a direct impact on others are almost universally regarded as both deviant and criminal. 
• Criminal behavior.
Although not always the case, many individuals regard breaking the law as a deviant act in and of itself, regardless of the nature of the act. By breaking the law, an individual engages in a defiance of accepted standards of public behavior. However, this definition of deviancy is by no means universal, and a common attribute of unpopular laws is that the majority of the citizenry does not regard disobedience to be a sign of deviant behavior. 
Thus, while socially deviant behavior can be criminal, not all criminal offenses are considered socially deviant. Especially in liberal societies, being socially deviant doesn't constitute criminal behavior. 
Social Deviancy and Criminal Behavior
However, state and society both often ascribe social deviancy to criminals. In fact, being able to point to the social deviancy of crime is vital to securing the legitimacy of the law in the eyes of a people. Laws which aren't seen as curbing socially deviant behaviors often fail to gain acceptance. Laws that criminalize acts that are nearly universally regarded as socially deviant include laws against rape, pedophilia, murder, violent robbery, or fraud. While those accused of these crimes may deny guilt, they very seldom attempt to defend the acts themselves. 
When a population isn't convinced a law enforces social norms, the law often fails. Perhaps the most dramatic example in recent history was Prohibition. Despite the best efforts of proponents, the majority of the population continued to consider alcohol socially acceptable, dooming Prohibition to eventual repeal. 
At the other end of the spectrum, perceptions of social deviancy can lead to laws designed specifically to punish deviancy, even where it involves no harm to others. Nudity ordinances are an example of criminal statutes designed solely to enforce social norms and punish social deviants who defy them. Obscenity statues are much the same, and in fact the Supreme Court's approach to obscenity explicitly makes reference to community social standards when determining if something is deviant enough to be labeled obscene. 
In these cases, individuals may have radically different opinions about the acceptable or deviant nature of the behavior in question. The legal dependence upon community standards and the average person’s interpretation of them make it clear that standards of social deviancy can vary widely from community to community. Unlike crimes such as murder, in these cases it's very difficult to achieve consensus as to what constitutes deviant behavior, and whether or not it should be criminalized. In the United States, such differences can divide states or even individual communities within those states. 
Changing Times and Changing Definitions of Deviancy
This brings up a final factor: definitions of deviant and criminal behavior can change over time, impacting both social and criminal aspects of how behaviors are regarded by society. A number of behaviors, from same-sex relationships to the advocacy of reproductive rights, have been demonized and met with legal sanction. As definitions of deviance change, especially in the eyes of the average population, the relationship between the law and deviant behavior shifts as well. 
In this way, both criminal and social standards of deviancy evolve over time, as does the average perception of what constitutes social and legal transgression. The two issues are tightly linked and will always affect each other through mutual influence.
Allison Gamble has been a curious student of psychology since high school. She brings her understanding of the mind to work in the weird world of internet marketing with forensicpsychology.net.
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Sunday, September 18, 2011
CFP - McDowell Conference
The Inaugural Dorothy Edgington Lectures will be given by Professor John McDowell
March 2nd-3rd 2012, Birkbeck College
As well as giving two public lectures, John McDowell will lead a 2 day graduate workshop on the Epistemology of Perception. We invite submissions on this topic, from graduate and postgraduate students, to be presented at the workshop.
SUBMISSION DEADLINE: 15th November 2011
SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS:
(1) Papers should be no more than 3,000 words 
(including footnotes, excluding bibliography), to be presented in 30 minutes
(2) They should be prepared for blind refereeing
(3) They should include a cover-sheet, with the title, an abstract, your name, institution affiliation, and student status
(4) They should be formatted with 1.5 spacing, 10pt font, and saved as .pdfs, or .doc (not .docx)
(5) Send all submissions to: edgingtonlectures@gmail.com
Small student bursaries will be available for speakers who require assistance with travel costs.
Accommodation for student speakers will be available with members of the department.
Workshop registration is free for graduate students, but there are limited spaces - to register for either the workshop or the lectures email: edgingtonlectures@gmail.com
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Monday, September 12, 2011
Perceptual Reports
I have uploaded a new version of my "Perceptual Reports" to my website. Here is the link.
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Labels: Papers, Perception
Saturday, September 03, 2011
Final Program for the 2011 Meeting of the Central States Philosophical Association
Program, Moonrise Hotel, St. Louis, September 15–17
All talks will take place at (across the street from the Moonrise Hotel):
Regional Arts Commission
6128 Delmar Blvd.
St. Louis, MO. 63112
Plenary Sessions
September 15, RAC- Conference Room C
5:00  Keynote Address:  John Doris, Washington University
Chair: Berit Brogaard, UMSL
September 16, RAC- Conference Room C
4:00  Business Meeting and Presidential Address: Berit Brogaard, UMSL
“Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm”
Chair: Paul Weirich, University of Missouri
5:00-7:00 Reception, Moonrise Rooftop
September 17, RAC- Conference Room C
5:00  Keynote Address: John Hawthorne, University of Oxford
Chair: Berit Brogaard, UMSL
Concurrent Sessions, RAC- Conference Room C, September 15		
9:00	An Impasse over Epistemic Value - A Critique of Linda Zagzebski's Arguments Against Pure Reliabilism and Proper Functionalism
Speaker: Devon Bryson, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
		Chair: John Greco, St. Louis University
		Commentator: Andrew Spear, Grand Valley State University
10:00		The Value of Knowledge: A Primary Good
Speaker: Daniel Pilchman, University of California, Irvine
		Chair: Heather Werner, UMSL
		Commentator: Kristian Marlow, UMSL
		
11:00 	Knowing Versus Knowledge - The Two Questions within the Secondary Value Problem
Speaker: Zack Robinson, UMSL
		Chair: Brendan Murday, Ithaca College
		Commentator: Trent Dougherty, Baylor University
12:00		Lunch
1:00 	Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude 
Speaker: Ross Inman, Trinity College, Dublin
		Chair:  John Heil, Washington University
		Commentator: Irem Kurtsal Steen, UMSL
2:00 	Functions Must be Performed at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations
Speaker: Gualtiero Piccinini, UMSL, and Justin Garson, Hunter College/City University of New York 
		Chair: Lynn Chien-Hui Chiu, University of Missouri
		Commentator: Eric Kraemer, University of Wisconsin-La Crosse
3:00 		Special Science Kinds - Property Clusters without Homeostasis
Speaker: Bernhard Nickel, Harvard University
		Chair: Sarah Robins, Washington University
Commentator: Christopher Pearson, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
4:00 		Panel: Natural Kinds
Speakers: Daniel A. Weiskopf, The Human Stain - Concepts, Anthropic Kinds, and Realism, Georgia State University
Andrew McFarland, How are Kinds Individuated?, University of Kansas
Alexander Bird, The Ontology of Natural Kinds, University of Bristol
John Camacho, Natural Kinds and Scientific Practices, UMSL
		Chair: Kent Staley, St. Louis University 
Concurrent Sessions, RAC- Conference Room B, September 15		
9:00		Frankfurt Cases, Gettier, and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
Speaker: Adam R. Thompson, University of Nebraska – Lincoln
		Chair: Krista Hyde, UMSL
		Commentator: Michael Neal, UMSL
10:00	Against Counterfactuals of Libertarian Freedom - There is Nothing I Would have Done if I Could Have Done Otherwise
Speaker: Paul C. Anders, Mount Marty College, and Joshua Thurow, College of Southern Nevada
		Chair: Seth Kurtenbach, University of Missouri
		Commentator: Grant Sterling, Eastern Illinois University
		
11:00 		Are There True Libertarian Action Counterfactuals?
Speaker: Daniel Rubio, Western Michigan University
		Chair: Krista Wiley, UMSL
		Commentator: David Killoren, University of Wisconsin – Madison
12:00		Lunch
1:00	Compositional Nihilism and the Puzzles of Coincidence: A Response to McGrath
Speaker: Holly Kantin, University of Wisconsin – Madison
		Chair: Leigh C. Vicens, University of Wisconsin – Madison
		Commentator: Andrew McFarland, University of Kansas
2:00		Physical Causal Closure and Non-Coincidental Mental Causation
Speaker: Leigh C. Vicens, University of Wisconsin – Madison
		Chair: Andrew Melnyk, University of Missouri
		Commentator: Eric Douglas Hiddleston, Wayne State University
		
3:00 		Hume, Counterfactuals and Causation
Speaker: Joshua Anderson, St. Louis University
		Chair: Dean Obermark, UMSL
		Commentator: John Camacho, UMSL
4:00 		Panel: Causation
Speakers: David Killoren, Moral Causation, Consequentialism, and the Hazards of Pure Metaethics, University of Wisconsin – Madison
Hannah Abigail Bondurant, Consciousness, Control, and Causation: Some Issues for the Cognitive Physicalist, UMSL
Nicholas K. Simmons, How Much Bearing Does the Correct Construal of 'Causation' Really Have on the Problem of Mental Causation?, University of Kansas
Andrew Ward, Causal Criteria, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Causal Inferences, University of Minnesota
		Chair: Simine Vazire, Washington University
Concurrent Sessions, RAC- Conference Room B, September 16		
9:00		Rawls on Rectification
Speaker: Sarah Kenehan, Marywood University
		Chair: Eric Wilcox, University of Missouri – Kansas City
		Commentator: Marcus Arvan, University of Tampa
10:00	Individual Rights and the Restrictive Force of Just Cause - A Response to Jeff McMahan
Speaker: Crystal Allen, University of Missouri
		Chair: Bre'Anna Liddell, UMSL
		Commentator: Eric Reitan, Oklahoma State University
		
11:00 		Killing in Self-Defense and the Doctrine of Double Effect
Speaker: Phil M. Mouch, Minnesota State University Moorhead
		Chair: David McGraw, UMSL
		Commentator: Crystal Allen, University of Missouri
12:00		Lunch
1:00 		From Insensitivity to Moral Debunking
Speaker: Matthew Braddock, Duke University
Chair: Dan Haybron, St. Louis University
		Commentator: Brian Besong, Purdue University
2:00 		Moral Perpendiculars
Speaker: Hallie Liberto, University of Connecticut
		Chair: Holly Kantin, University of Wisconsin – Madison
		Commentator: Molly Gardner, University of Wisconsin – Madison
3:00 		Moral Intuitionism and Fundamental Disagreement
Speaker: Brian Besong, Purdue University
		Chair: Mylan Engel, Jr., Northern Illinois University
		Commentator: Brian Hutchinson, Metropolitan State College of Denver
Concurrent Sessions, RAC- Conference Room C, September 16	
	
9:00 	Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism and Resolving the Internalist/Externalist Controversy
Speaker: Mylan Engel Jr., Northern Illinois University
		Chair: Matthew Cashen, Southern Illinois University Edwardsville
		Commentator: Matthew Braddock, Duke University
10:00 	Against the Minimalistic Reading of Epistemic Contextualism - A Reply to Wolfgang Freitag
Speaker: Michael D. Ashfield, Northern Illinois University
		Chair: Jeff Dauer, Washington University
		Commentator: Geoff Pynn, Northern Illinois University
11:00 		Knowledge, Assertion, and the Belief that One Knows
Speaker: Dylan Black, Indiana University – Bloomington
		Chair: Michael D. Ashfield, Northern Illinois University
		Commentator: Brendan Murday, Ithaca College
12:00		Lunch
1:00 		Options and Epistemic Modals
Speaker: Tomis Kapitan, Northern Illinois University
		Chair: Roy Sorensen, Washington University
		Commentator: Wenwen Fan, University of Missouri
2:00 		Epistemic Modals and Practical Reasoning
Speaker: Joshua S. Heter, St. Louis University
		Chair: Andrew Spear, Grand Valley State University
		Commentator: Lisa Cagle, Washington University
3:00 		Determining the Field of Concern with Knowledge
Speaker: Seth Kurtenbach, University of Missouri
		Chair: Jessica Wilson, UMSL
		Commentator: John Pauley, Simpson College
Concurrent Sessions, RAC- Conference Room C, September 17	
9:00		On Hawthorne on Lewis on the Case for Modal Realism
Speaker: Robert William Fischer, University of Illinois at Chicago
		Chair: Thomas Sattig, Washington University
		Commentator: John Gabriel, Washington University
10:00		Cappelen, Content Relativism, and the “Creative Interpreter”
Speaker: Mark Criley, Illinois Wesleyan University
		Chair: Nicholas Baima, Washington University
		Commentator: Ronald Loeffler, Grand Valley State University
		
11:00 		A Prosententialist Account of Vagueness
Speaker: Renee Jorgensen, Northern Illinois University
		Chair: Ronald Glass, University of Wisconsin-La Crosse
		Commentator: Nicholas Baima, Washington University
12:00		Lunch
1:00 		A Simple Proof of Mind-Body Dualism
Speaker: Marcus Arvan, University of Tampa
		Chair: Ronald Loeffler, Grand Valley State University
		Commentator: Daniel Ryan Weed, UMSL
2:00 		The Fact of Cartesian Qualia
Speaker: Brett Coppenger, University of Iowa
		Chair: William Robinson, Iowa State University
		Commentator: Donald Sievert, University of Missouri
3:00 		The (One and Only) Argument for Physicalism about the Mind
Speaker: Jared Bates, Hanover College
		Chair: Marcus Arvan, University of Tampa
		Commentator: Angie Harris, University of Utah
	
4:00 		Panel: Physicalism
Speakers: William S. Robinson, The Poverty of Physicalism, Iowa State University
Andrew Melnyk, Pereboom on the Formulation of Non-reductive Physicalism, University of Missouri
Eric Kraemer, The Challenges of Non-Physicalism, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse
		Chair: Jared Bates, Hanover College
 
Concurrent Sessions, RAC- Conference Room B, September 17		
9:00		Remembering Does Entail Knowing
Speaker: Andrew Moon, University of Missouri
		Chair: Lisa Cagle, Washington University
		Commentator: Zack Robinson, UMSL
10:00		Fallibilism and the Flexibility of Epistemic Modals
Speaker: Charity Anderson, St. Louis University
		Chair: Amy Broadway, UMSL
		Commentator: Andrew Moon, University of Missouri
		
11:00 		Skepticism in the Problem of the Criterion
Speaker: Brendan Murday, Ithaca College
		Chair: Mark Steen, UMSL
		Commentator: Casey Swank, St. Cloud State University
12:00		Lunch
1:00 		A Textualist Argument for a Living Constitution
Speaker: A. J. Kreider, Miami Dade College
Chair: Xiaofei Liu, University of Missouri
		Commentator: John Collins, East Carolina University
2:00 		Republican Political Justification and Unreasonable Citizens
Speaker: Christopher McCammon, University of Nebraska – Lincoln/Grand View College
		Chair: Christian Richeson, UMSL
		Commentator: Richard Lauer, University of Missouri
3:00 		The Connection between Political Legitimacy and Justification
Speaker: Leo Yan, University of Missouri
		Chair: Daniel Pilchman, UC Irvine
Commentator: Christopher McCammon, University of Nebraska – Lincoln/Grand View College
4:00 		Panel: Risk
Speakers: Ashton T. Sperry-Taylor, Bounded Rationality, Risk, and Moral Heuristics, University of Missouri
Michael Neal, Epistemic Risk, Epistemic Peerage, and Rational Disagreement, UMSL
		Chair: Kevin Lepore, UMSL
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Labels: Conferences


