tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31003419.post115367385901395926..comments2023-11-02T07:50:38.614-05:00Comments on Lemmings: Bach and Chalmers on Belief ReportsBrit Brogaardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17944929071368873218noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31003419.post-58111523687390391892011-11-10T08:15:27.741-06:002011-11-10T08:15:27.741-06:00Yeah, I am wondering if the problem goes away if p...Yeah, I am wondering if the problem goes away if propositional attitude ascriptions are to be analyzed ala Chalmers (his Nous paper)?Brit Brogaardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17944929071368873218noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31003419.post-85112547290877190732011-11-10T00:59:52.317-06:002011-11-10T00:59:52.317-06:00Sorry for not being clearer - my thought was that ...Sorry for not being clearer - my thought was that some sentences of the form 'S believes that a is F', in context, are to be read as only specifying the object of the belief, leaving the cognitive/conceptual content of the belief un(der)specified.<br /><br />This seems like a counterexample to the Assumption as stated, but maybe there's an issue over 'proposition' here; with a Millian/Russellian notion of propositions plugged-in, the Assumption remains unaffected by my point. <br /><br />I was thinking of propositions as involving sense, concepts, modes of presentation or something like that. (I'm being deliberately vague here for the sake of cross-compatibility with other philosophers.)Tristan Hazehttp://sprachlogik.blogspot.com/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31003419.post-52282419335295293072011-11-10T00:30:29.831-06:002011-11-10T00:30:29.831-06:00So what's wrong with the specification assumpt...So what's wrong with the specification assumption?Brit Brogaardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17944929071368873218noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31003419.post-1171627494795009232011-07-30T23:45:11.350-05:002011-07-30T23:45:11.350-05:00I reject the specification assumption.
From a co...I reject the specification assumption. <br /><br />From a comment made in the context of <a href="http://sprachlogik.blogspot.com/2011/06/sketch-of-way-of-thinking-about.html" rel="nofollow">a discussion of modality</a> (and recycled once already in <a href="http://www.philosophyetc.net/2011/07/guest-post-adveritisement-for.html" rel="nofollow">a discussion of individual concepts</a>!):<br /><br />'In short, my view is that the name 'Hesperus' in a belief report like:<br /><br />(A) Ralph believes that Hesperus is F.<br /><br />can be read as doing two things at once. (1) specifying the object of Ralph's belief, and (2) specifying the concept (or mode of presentation) via which he has it. On such a reading, (1) could be expanded to:<br /><br />(B) Ralph believes, of Hesperus, via his Hesperus-concept, that it is F.<br /><br />(A similar thing could be done for the 'F', but I'll keep it simple.) Some belief reports, on the other hand - purely de re belief-reports - may be read as only specifying the object. (A) read this way could be expanded to:<br /><br />(C) Ralph believes, of Hesperus, via *some* concept(s), that it is F.'Tristan Hazehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18008340011384137776noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31003419.post-91797607006916864162009-11-23T18:52:31.710-06:002009-11-23T18:52:31.710-06:00That is offensive. Don't leave any more comme...That is offensive. Don't leave any more comments on my blog.Brit Brogaardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17944929071368873218noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31003419.post-8270629144758288722009-11-23T08:54:00.966-06:002009-11-23T08:54:00.966-06:00This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com